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Abstract 
Recent research has shown that children under two years 
demonstrate some early social understanding. Previous research has also 
demonstrated that mother talk about mental states is a factor in older 
preschoolers' later theory of mind understanding. In order to learn more 
about the predictive nature of mother mental state talk to very young 
children, this study examined the relation between mother talk about. 
mental states at 15 and 24 months and their later mental state language and 
emotion understanding at 24 and 33 months. 
At all three time points, 71 mothers and 3 fathers (N=74) described 
pictures to their infants and mother talk was coded for mental and non-
mental state language at 15, 24 and 33 JnOnths. In addition, at all three time 
points, children's mental and non-mental state vocabulary levels were 
obtained via parental report. At the second and third time points the 
children were administered an emotion situation and a body emotion task. 
The mothers' ability to interpret emotion faces was also assessed. 
The results showed that mother use of desire language was more 
prevalent at 15 months, with references to thinking and knowledge 
increasing at 24 months. 
Partial correlations demonstrated that mother use of desire language 
with 15-month old children uniquely predicted a child's mental state 
language and emotion situation task performance at 24 months, even after 
accounting for earlier child language, mother socioeconomic status, 
mothers' own emotion understanding, and other types of mother non-
mental state language. Similarly, at 24 months of age, after accounting for 
potentially confounding variables, such as child language, mother use of 
think/know language as well as desire language were both predictors of 
children's mental state language and emotion task performance at 33 
months. 
The results further demonstrated that mothers' tendency to refer to 
the child's (versus others') desires at 15 months was the more consistent 
correlate of children's mental state language and emotion understanding at 
24 months. At 24 months a different pattern emerged with both references 
to the child's and others' thoughts and knowledge correlating with child 
mental state language and emotion task performance at 33 months. 
It is proposed that Vygotsky' s zone of proximal development 
provides a framework within which maternal talk about specific mental 
states scaffolds the development of children's later social understanding. I 
also suggest that such scaffolding motivates mothers to talk more about the 
child's mental states when they are younger, before introducing talk that 
focuses on others' mental states. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
I have one very clear memory as a child; I was about 9 years old. 
My mother had asked me for the umpteenth time to tidy my room, but 
being a dreamy, bookish kind of child, I was going about this task with a 
decided lack of vigour. Oblivious to my mother's increasing frustration at 
my lack of commitment to the job, I suddenly turned to her and said, "Do 
you know Mum, everything I do in the world is about me, and everything I 
think of always comes back to me". Those particular philosophical 
musings regarding my sudden realization of 'self' didn't go down very 
well at that particular moment, but nonetheless sowed the seed for my 
interest in the human mind. It is perhaps no coincidence that these 
childhood reflections on the mind also coincided with my delight in 
playing 'spying' games, trying to outwit one's opponent by "thinking what 
they' re thinking". 
Since having my own children, my interest in the mind of the child 
took on new dimensions: 
Helen (aged 4): What are you doing Mummy? 
Mummy: I'm thinking. 
Helen: Your brain has gone to Christchurch for a holiday. 
Mia (aged 6): If her brain's gone to Christchurch for a holiday how can 
she think. 
Aside from the lack of disquiet over their mother's brain catching a 
bus to Christchurch, there were three things that I found so striking about 
this conversation: First, that children are as interested as adults in making 
sense of their world or in explaining others' behaviours (in this case, their 
., 
( 
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mothers' vacant expression directed into the distance). Second, that Helen 
(the younger child) had an appreciation of the mental process of 'thinking' 
as reflecting a sort of inaccessible mental content. Finally, that language 
provided the children with a means to reflect at a meta-level on what it 
meant to 'think'. 
Notwithstanding my own personal interest in these ideas, many 
researchers all over the world have been intrigued by similar questions. 
Stated simply: how do children come to learn about the mind and its 
contents and why is it important for them to have an appreciation of this? 
The second question is in some ways simpler to answer than the 
first. As humans we are naturally social creatures, who live in 
communities and seek out company. We are also highly sophisticated 
creatures. We communicate using a symbolic verbal system of sounds and 
we live in highly developed, complex social groups. And, just as we need 
traffic lights and signposts to help navigate our physical environment, we 
also need a system to direct, manage and understand our social encounters. 
One step in the right direction in understanding the social world is 
to construe others' actions and behaviours in terms of their mental states, 
that is, their intentions, desires, thoughts, knowledge and emotions (these 
inaccessible contents of the mind). This mental understanding of others 
has typically been referred to as a 'theory of mind' (Premack & Woodruff, 
1978), that is, theoretical representations of (unobservable) concepts which 
we use to infer the reasons for others' behaviour. To adults, a world 
without an appreciation of others' mental states seems completely 
inconceivable, and indeed the conversation described above even attests to 
children's relatively early appreciation of others' minds. 
But what do children really know about the mind? Since Premack 
and Woodruff (1978) raised the question of whether a chimpanzee has a 
theory of mind, the ensuing debate unleashed a flurry of research directed 
at how one could test belief understanding in children. Arising out of a 
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and Perner (1983) devised a task which applied a stringent test for 
understanding the relation and differences between one's own knowledge 
about the world and a person's false belief about similar events in the 
world. Their results revealed that 5-year-olds but not 3-year-olds could 
predict that a person would look for something on the basis of where they 
thought it was, rather than where the child knew it to be. Understanding 
false belief became the 'acid test' of a theory of mind and generated a 
substantial body of research regarding the representational nature of 
children's mental state understanding and the processes underlying the 
deveiopment of theory of mind (see Olson, Astington, & Harris, 1988; 
Perner, 1991; Leslie, 1987; Wellman, 1990). 
During those halcyon days of theory of mind research, two 
conferences in Toronto (1986) and Oxford (1986) brought together ideas 
that helped explode the boundaries of theory of mind research (Olson et al., 
1988). Two strands of research emerged from these early meetings. First, 
the question of how children represent these mental state concepts 
especially with respect to the relation between children's understanding of 
perception, knowledge and inference. In particular, researchers started to 
think more about how younger children's earlier conceptualisation of 
mental states such as intentions, desires and emotions serve as a precursor 
to false belief understanding. In Chapter 2, I present a broad definition of 
social understanding and examine in some detail the components of 
children's early theory of mind. I als~ consider the theoretical frameworks 
in which children's developing social understanding has been construed. 
The second strand of research concerned the role of social 
interaction and communication. Researchers began to question more 
forcefully the role of experience in children's developing social 
understanding. Work by Judy Dunn was especially concerned with 
capturing an understanding of children's knowledge of the social world, 
through their family conversations about mental states and especially 
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contexts may allow children to reflect on their inner states (e.g., emotions). 
As such, her findings detailed a relation between conversations about 
emotions, thoughts and knowledge, and children's later understanding of 
false belief (Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 1991; Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, 
Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991). Drawing together both strands of research, 
what became increasingly apparent was the importance of language 
development in a child's developing theory of mind (Astington & Baird, 
2005), which I focus on in Chapter 3. The questions surrounding this 
research focus generated interest in the potentially implicit nature of early 
mind understanding. Indeed, the subsequent research findings suggested 
that between 2 and 3 years, children exhibit an earlier implicit 
understanding of false belief (as measured by eye gaze), despite their 
verbal responses indicating they judged the protagonist's beliefs in terms of 
what the child knew to be true (Clements & Perner, 1994; Garnham & 
Perner, 2000; Ruffman, Garnham, Import, & Connolly, 2001). Furthermore, 
the spotlight also turned to how the acquisition of specific linguistic 
components such as syntax and semantics related to theory of mind 
(Astington & Jenkins, 1999; de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Hale & Tager-
Flusberg, 2003; Ruffman, Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey, & Garnham, 2003). 
Related to this research direction, a cluster of correlational studies 
emerged, highlighting a relation between the language mothers used and 
children's false belief understanding (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Meins & 
Fernyhough, 1999; Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002). Thus, continuing on 
from the Ruffman et al. (2002) study and influenced by the work of Meins, 
and Fernyhough (1999) I wanted to examine how maternal input (both· 
mental and non-mental state) directed at children who were just beginning 
to use language, related to their understanding of mental states and 
emotion understanding. I was particularly interested in situating this 
research within Vygotsky' s theoretical construct of the zone of proximal 
development. I hypothesized that parental talk about mental states, when 
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understanding, may bootstrap further understanding of mental state 
language as well as mental life in general, such as emotion understanding. 
Furthermore, I hypothesized that mothers' focus on the child's rather than 
others' mental states, particularly when they are still learning about the 
relation of behaviours to underlying mental states, provides another 
opportunity to scaffold and deepen mental state understanding. I 
specifically focus on one aspect of communication, that is, picture 
description, as it provides a standard semi-controlled context in which to 
examine mothers' talk over subsequent time points (see Chapter 4). In my 
analysis (Chapters 5 and 6), not only do I consider how specific mother 
mental state terms may relate to children's later mental state language and 
emotion understanding, but I also examine how mothers' referring style 
(i.e., referring to the child's, their own or others' mental states) may assist 
in children's later understanding of mental life (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 
2006). As such, this study represents a novel contribution to some of the 
questions concerning how very young children might learn about mental 






CHAPTER 2: WHAT IS SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING? 6 
Chapter 2 Children's Social 
Understanding 
The ability to ascribe others with mental states and to interpret a 
person's behaviour on the basis of these mental states is a particularly 
useful human tool, rendering us extremely efficient social navigators. 
What's more, the capacity to ascribe others with false beliefs and to happily 
acknowledge that a person could act or behave on the basis of their false 
beliefs has been considered a hallmark of our adult folk psychology. 
Based on Premack and Woodruff's (1978) seminal examination of 
mind-reading abilities in apes, the first classic human false-belief task 
administered on a group of children, revealed that only 5-year-olds could 
pass specific tasks that tested their ability to ascribe others with false beliefs 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983), with subsequent research lowering the passing 
age to include 4-years-olds (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Since this 
finding, the field of social cognition in children has enjoyed consistent and 
thoughtful exploration, providing important insights into the development 
of social understanding. 
The aims of this chapter are to: (1) provide a working definition of 
social understanding, (2) discuss ways in which social understanding has 
been measured in infancy and early childhood, and (3) present the 
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2.1 What is Social Understanding? 
An understanding of oth.ers' minds allows us shared mental 
insights, which we use to navigate our social encounters. Although an 
adult's ability to socially interpret the world assumes an understanding of 
mind, in children and especially infants, this remains an open question. 
Typically, mental state understanding is discussed under the rubric of 
theory of mind. However, in charting the development of a child's ability to 
make sense of their encounters with people and objects in their social 
world, I use as my point of reference, the phrase 'social understanding' 
(Dunn, 1988). My reasoning for taking this broader approach (Moore, 
1996) is influenced by Dunn's observation of the paradoxical lag between 
children's overt demonstrations of social understanding ( e.g., false belief 
understanding at 4 years) and the apparent skill of infants in 
demonstrating an understanding of human behaviour. The participation 
of infants as social interlocutors may not necessarily entail the 
understanding that social behaviour is framed by a person's mental 
attitudes, that is, thoughts, knowledge, desires towards objects and entities 
in the world. Rather, infants may initially participate in social activities 
such as joint attention, turn taking and gaze following, through the use of 
general learning mechanisms that allow them to pick up on behavioural 
contingencies (Baldwin, 2002; Moore & Corkum, 1994; Perner & Ruffman, 
2005; Phillips, Wellman, & Spelke, 2002; Ruffman & Perner, 2005). In other 
words, infants certainly possess social understanding whether or not this 
understanding includes insight into mental states. 
2.2 Measuring Social Understanding 
In the following sections, I examine in some detail how social 
understanding has been measured in young children. As I am interested in 
early social understanding in very young children, that is, social 
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(Bartsch & Estes, 1996), I focus specifically on purported early 
manifestations of social understanding such as intention, desires and 
emotions. These insights have been examined in two different ways: (1) 
laboratory based tasks that test children's ability to interpret and predict 
others' actions and behaviour, and (2) linguistic and non-linguistic parent-
child or family interactions. These two facets of the general measure of 
social understanding provide complementary information. Laboratory 
tasks are able to directly target a specific aspect of social understanding 
within standardized and controlled environments. On the other hand, 
observing children's appreciation of the social world through naturalistic 
observation also provides insights into how children's interactions with 
others assist in facilitating their social understanding. Related to this, 
Bartsch and Wellman (1995) argued strongly for examining children's own 
mental state language in order to gain insights into children's developing 
social understanding. They state, "Our basic assumption is that children's talk 
about the mind can reveal their conceptions of the mind. Even though language 
development does not map onto conceptual development in any strict sense, an 
analysis of discourse can nonetheless provide an important window onto 
conception" (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995, page 17). Therefore, although one 
cannot be sure that children's mental state language necessarily refers to 
mental states, mental state language is liable to bear some relation to 
children's understanding of the social world. 
2.2.1 Understanding Intentions 
Inherent to an adult's understanding of the social world is the fact 
that people act and behave on the basis of their intentions, such that a 
person's mental states are directed at, or are about, certain objects or a state 
of affairs (e.g., Searle, 1983). More recently, research has focused on the 
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Searle (1983) has conceptualized intentions as a dichotomy between 
'prior intentions' and 'intentions in action'. Prior intentions are mental 
states that exist in the mind of the agent, for example, "I will eat my 
broccoli" or "I'm going to eat my broccoli". Intentions in this sense are 
carried out or at least attempted by the agent. On the other hand, 
intentions in action are purposeful behaviors that may or may not be 
motivated by prior intentions. As Searle elaborates, these types of 
intentions form a large component of our everyday activities, for example, 
when concentrating on a particularly thorny problem, one may begin to 
pick one's nose. Such an activity may not necessarily arise out of a 
conscious intention to pick one's nose; the intention is intrinsically bound 
up with the action. The majority of research investigating intention 
understanding in young children has focused on its relation to action. 
Meltzoff (1995) demonstrated using an imitation procedure, that 18-month-
olds were able to complete target acts after only having observed a 
partially completed action by a person (but not by a mechanical device). In 
a similar vein, other studies reported 14-month-olds as understanding 
accidental versus purposeful action (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 
1998), and children as young as 9 months as understanding agents as 
unwilling versus unable (Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005). 
Meltzoff' s and others' main interpretation of these findings is that children 
understand that an agent has a purpose in mind when performing the 
action, that is, they interpret a person's goal-directed behaviour as 
mentalistic, underlaid by their desires, beliefs and knowledge. 
Others have interpreted infants' goal-directed understanding of 
action in less rich ways (Csibrai 2003; Csibra, Biro, Koos, & Gergely, 2003; 
Csibra & Gergely, 1998). In one of a series of studies, infants observed a 
large ball following the path of a smaller ball in a familiarisation phase 
(goal: to chase or catch the small ball). In this same phase, when faced with 
an obstacle (e.g., an opening too small for the large ball), the large ball 
skirted around the obstacle to continue following the path of the smaller 
), 
r 
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ball. Then in the test phase, in the condition incongruent with the intended 
goal (i.e., to chase or catch the small ball), the large ball overshot the path of 
the smaller ball (i.e., not" chasing" the small ball) whereas in the congruent 
condition, the large ball caught up with the small ball. Infants looked 
longer at the condition that violated the intended goal. Yet rather than 
ascribing an understanding of goals to infants, these researchers suggest 
that infants take a "teleological stance", meaning that infants understand 
end states as goal-driven without necessarily attributing desires or beliefs 
in an understanding of those goals. 
Moore (1999) and Moore and Corkum (1994) have also adopted a 
leaner perspective on infants' intention understanding. Moore's (1999) 
account is best conceptualized within the triadic relation of child, adult and 
object. On this account, Moore charts a developmental progression in 
which the infant initially does not view the adult's intentional orientation 
towards an object as independent of the infant's orientation towards the 
object. Similarly, an infant's understanding of their own intentions is also 
viewed within the triadic interaction, that is, via the adult's orientation 
towards the object. It is not until later, that children disengage from this 
"intentional we", and develop the capacity to understand the intentional 
attitude of another by simulating the intention as it relates to themselves. 
Likewise, when reflecting on their own intentions they are able to simulate 
the action or state of affairs from the other's perspective. It is not until this 
latter stage that Moore claim children understand the psychological 
relation between agents and objects. 
Other alternative accounts to a rich mentalistic interpretation of 
infant understanding of intention propose that success on these tasks could 
be accounted for through learning, possibly via stochastic means (Baldwin, 
2002). That is, infants might detect contingencies between particular 
actions and end states. In this. way, infants' accumulated experience in 
performing and observing actions might provide the basis for predicting 
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To briefly summarize, what is unclear based on these infant studies 
is the extent to which children's understanding of people's intentions needs 
to be conceptualized as mentalistic. Regardless, however, of whether 
children interpret others' intentions as psychological relations between 
people and objects or on the basis of contingent responding (i.e., the ability 
to predict their actions), their success on intention tasks shows that they are 
skilled when it comes to understanding many social interactions. 
2.2.2 Understanding Desires 
An integral part of an adult's social understanding is the 
understanding that people are motivated by their desires, intentions and 
goals. Such an understanding allows adults to predict and interpret actions 
based on the antecedents and consequences of desires. To illustrate this, 
adults understand that a person may try to obtain something they desire 
and feel happy or sad depending on whether the desire is fulfilled or not. 
Adults also understand that not only do others have desires which may 
differ from their own, but that the way in which they satisfy their desires 
may be different. 
Researchers have also been interested in when young children begin 
to understand that behaviour is framed by a person's internal experience of 
desiring. As noted in section 2.2.1 on intention understanding, it is 
plausible that children's initial understanding of desire may not be 
mentalistically construed. For example, young children may construe 
desire as inherent in objects in that some objects may be more desirable 
than others. Additionally, a na'ive conceptual understanding of desire may 
manifest itself egocentrically, that is, children may believe all people will 
desire things that they desire. These naYve conceptualizations of desire 
would thus lead children to occasionally make inaccurate predictions about 
a person's desires. 
To explore some of these ideas, Repacholi and Gopnik (1997) 
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desires. They found that 18- but not 14-month-olds were able to determine 
which of two foods, would be most desired by a person based on their 
previous affective responses. Eighteen-month-olds offered broccoli to an 
adult when the adult had expressed desire towards broccoli and disgust 
toward crackers, even though children themselves chose crackers. In 
contrast, 14-month-olds only gave crackers, the food that they themselves 
preferred. 
Wellman (1990) showed that children aged between 2.5 and 3.0 
years would accurately predict when a person would continue or stop 
searching for an object depending on whether their desire had been 
fulfilled (i.e., whether they had found the desired object). Such children 
were also able to judge how a person would feel based on their success or 
failure in fulfilling a desire (i.e., that the person would feel happy when 
they get what they want, and sad when they don't). In addition, older 3-
year-olds reason that someone who emotes positively toward an unseen 
object desires that object (Wellman, Phillips, & Rodriguez, 2000). 
Other studies have considered the language children use as an index 
of their desire understanding. Bartsch and Wellman (1995) systematically 
examined child talk for references to genuine mental states, that is, mental 
states which reflected an understanding of their own and others' minds 
rather than simply being conversational devices. Their naturalistic 
observations have shown that by 18 months, children begin to use genuine 
desire terms (e.g., I want to play with it), with 'want' reported to be one of 
the earliest examples of mental state language. 
Bretherton and Beeghly (1982) reported more general references to 
'volitional' states (including desire) than to cognitive states amongst 28-
month-olds. They also found that mother reports of 28-month-olds' 
internal state vocabulary correlated with children's performance on an 
emotion recognition task. This finding is consistent with the idea that 
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In a study which looked at the connectedness of desire language 
with other types of internal state language, Wellman, Phillips and 
Rodriguez (2000) identified many instances in which 2.5-year-olds 
commented explicitly on the connection between desires and perceptions 
(e.g., I see him, I want to go up there), and desires and emotions (I want 
some sugar, I like sugar). 
To summarize, there are signs that children as young as 18 months 
pass linguistically simple tasks that tap desire understanding. Tasks which 
are more linguistically demanding show that older 2-year-olds and 3-year-
olds have an understanding of desire. 
2.2.3 Understanding Emotions 
As discussed in the previous sections, children's understanding of 
intentions and desires is connected to their understanding of emotions. 
Indeed, many researchers have emphasized the importance of affective 
understanding in a young child's broader social understanding (Bartsch & 
Estes, 1996; Dunn, 1999; Ruffman, 2000; Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, 
& Cooke, 1989). 
Work by Susan Denham finds support for the idea that 
understanding emotions is important for general social understanding. 
She and her colleagues demonstrated a connection between the emotion 
competence of 3- and 4-year-olds (including their emotional knowledge, 
emotion regulation and emotion expressiveness) and specific aspects of 
social competence, including indices of peer popularity, children's 
sensitivity/ cooperativeness and their isolation/ withdrawal (Denham, 
1986; Denham, Zoller, & Couchoud, 1994; Denham et al., 2003). Of note, 
especially for the present study, was the finding that the older children in 
the sample showed much less variation in their emotion knowledge than 
younger children. As suggested by Denham et al. (2003), the higher degree 
of variance in younger children's emotion knowledge may make emotion 
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understanding ( e.g., such knowledge might assist children in regulating 
group situations, particularly concerning group conflict) . 
A series of studies by Judy Dunn and colleagues has also focused on 
the central role emotions play in social understanding, within early social 
encounters. (Dunn, Bretherton, & Munn, 1987; Dunn et al., 1991; Dunn et 
al., 1991). In particular, Dunn (1999) highlights the opportunities 
emotionally charged environments provide for advancing children's 
conceptual understanding of emotions. Emotionally charged environments 
provide parents and children with opportunities to comment on internal 
states, a tendency linked to children's later abilities in recognizing 
emotions in others (Dunn et al., 1991), and in explaining actions in terms of 
false beliefs (Dunn et al., 1991). In addition, within specific emotional 
contexts such as disputes, children are also more likely to engage in the 
discussion of causes regarding a particular behaviour, than when not in 
disputes (Dunn et al., 1991). 
Studies of infants' and young children's understanding of emotion 
also strongly suggest a developmental progression in children's 
understanding of the referential role for emotion. To illustrate, Phillips, 
Wellman and Spelke (2002) found that infants as young as 12 but not 8 
months made the connection between the actor's emotional regard towards 
an object (e.g., repeated reaching for one object rather than another) and a 
subsequent tendency to reach for the object. Furthermore, they discovered 
that for 14-month-olds but not 12-month-olds, emotional regard on its own 
(i.e., positively emoting toward one object without reaching) was a 
sufficient cue for causing infants to expect one to subsequently reach for 
that object. Moses, Baldwin, Rosicky and Tidball (2001) throw light on this 
discrepency by examining the cues 12- and 18-month-old infants use to 
disambiguate the referential intent of a person toward a novel but 
ambiguous stimulus. Moses et al. showed that 18-month-old infants were 
less likely to approach an ambiguous novel object if it had been paired with 
an expression of disgust. Unlike older infants, 12-month-old infants did 
\ 
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not show any indication of responding differentially to the referential cues 
offered by the speaker and therefore under these conditions do not appear 
to use emotion as a cue for social referencing. 
What is also interesting about the changes in 12- to 18-month-olds' 
emotion understanding is the concurrent change in their understanding 
and use of affective language. Children as young as 18 months have been 
reported to use emotion language (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Dunn et al., 
1987; Ridgeway, Waters, & Kuczaj, 1985). Although there is some 
disagreement over which terms are more frequently used, the most 
common emotion words seem to be references to delight, distress, fear and 
anger (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Dunn et al., 1987; Huttenlocher & 
Smiley, 1990). Furthermore, children will frequently use emotion and 
desire language together to explain a person's behaviour (Wellman et al., 
2000). Other studies have looked more directly at the relation between 
children's internal state vocabulary (including emotion and desire 
language) and their emotion understanding. For instance, recall that 
Bretherton and Beeghly (1982) found that mother reports of 28-month-olds' 
internal state vocabulary correlated with children's performance on an 
emotion recognition task. These findings lend support to the idea that 
emotion understanding is an important component of early social 
understanding. 
2.2.4 Understanding Beliefs 
Standard false belief tasks 
Another component of a theory of mind is belief understanding. 
Typically, in order to measure beliefs in children, researchers have used . 
tasks that tap false-belief understanding. An example of such a task is the 
'unexpected transfer task' (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In this task, a child 
observes a scene in which a boy 'Maxi' places some chocolate in a box 
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moves the chocolate to a cupboard (Location 2). On Maxi's return, the 
child is asked where he thinks Maxi will look for the chocolate. Children 
who understand or are able to imagine another person holding a belief that 
is different from their own will state that Maxi will look in the original 
location (Location 1). That is, despite seeing the chocolate transferred and 
therefore knowing the chocolate is in a different location, the child must 
realize that Maxi 'thinks' the chocolate is in Location 1 (rather than in 
Location 2). In other words, children cannot just ascribe their own belief to 
the story character. Around 4 years of age, children will indicate that Maxi 
will look in the location that the chocolate was originally placed in 
(Wellman et al., 2001). 
Implicit understanding of belief 
Following this well replicated finding, other researchers have 
considered whether younger children may exhibit an implicit 
understanding of false belief (Clements & Perner, 1994; Garnham & Perner, 
2000; Garnham & Ruffman, 2001; Ruffman, 2000; Ruffman et al., 2001. 
Typically, in these studies, children are exposed to a verbal false belief task 
and they are then tested on both their anticipatory looking to a particular 
location and their explicit verbalization of where the protagonist will look 
To test for anticipatory looking, before the protagonist returns, children are 
prompted by a question, which is designed to elicit an implicit response 
measured by their direction of eye gaze to either of the two locations ( e.g., 
experimenter asks "I wonder where Sam is going to look"). Following this 
anticipatory prompt, the protagonist returns and the children are explicitly 
asked where the protagonist will go to search for the hidden object The 
general finding from these studies is that the majority of children older 
than 2 years, 11 months will look to the correct location (correctly 
anticipate), but state incorrectly where the protagonist will search. The 
vast majority of children younger than 2;11 will not look to the correct 
location. Therefore, the studies demonstrate a marked shift in 
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initially, knowledge may be available implicitly, that is, in a non-
verbalizable form before children are able to explicitly make judgements 
about their own or others' knowledge (Clements & Perner, 1994) 
Infant understanding of belief 
The most recent research on belief understanding has challenged the 
findings that children under 2 years, 11 months do not possess even an 
implicit understanding of false-belief. Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) 
adapted the verbal unexpected transfer false-belief task (described above) 
to an entirely non-verbal task suitable for older infants (15-month-olds) 
using a 'violation of expectation' looking paradigm. If the actor searches in 
a location which violates where infants 'think' the actor 'thinks' the object 
should be, infants' increased looking time to that location is taken as an 
index of their 'surprise'. In this task, the infant is first habituated to an 
actor placing a toy in one of two locations (Box A). The child is then 
inducted into one of two conditions: true belief or false belief. In the true 
belief induction condition, both the child and the actor observe the toy 
move into the other location (Box B). The actor then goes away. There are 
then two test conditions. In the first test condition, the actor returns and 
then proceeds to reach into the box that holds the toy (Box B) ( concurs with 
expectation). In the second test condition, the actor returns and then 
proceeds to reach into the box that does not hold the toy (Box A). The actor 
is thus violating the child's expectation of where the actor should look 
because the actor should believe that the toy is in Box B because they saw it 
move to Box B. The children in this test condition should look longer at the 
Box A event. In the false belief condition, only the child is present when 
the toy is moved from the original location (A) to the new location (B). 
Similar to the verbal unexpected transfer task, the actor still 'believes' that 
the toy is in box A, even though it has moved to box B. Again, the 
children's looking times in two test conditions are measured. When the 
actor returns, she reaches either to box A ( original location where she 
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longer when the actor reaches to box B, because the actor has violated the 
expectation of where she should look (box A where she originally placed 
the toy and where she should believe the toy to be). 
The results of this study suggest that 15-month-olds indeed look 
longer in both true- and false-belief conditions, when actors searched in the 
location that did not concur with their belief of where the object should be. 
These findings add to the seeming paradox of infant versus child 
behaviour. Such infant mind precocity has engendered a certain amount of 
controversy and has been interpreted in various ways. On the face of it, 
Onishi and Baillargeon' s study suggests that infants may possess a 
'rudimentary and implicit form' of false belief. In particular, the purported 
success of 15-month-olds on this task has generated debate between 
theorists who claim that increasing representational capacity progresses 
incrementally during the pre-school years versus modularity theorists, who 
claim that children are innately endowed with the capacity to represent 
beliefs (see below). As discussed in section 2.2.1 on intention 
understanding in young children, it is difficult to fully attribute infants 
with a mentalistic understanding of a person's actions, when one could 
explain the task using non-mentalistic accounts of infants' looking 
behaviour (Perner & Ruffman, 2005; Ruffman & Perner, 2005). One such 
explanation offered by Perner and Ruffman (2005) suggests that infants 
process the actor's actions by forming three-way associations between the 
agent, object and location. At a neuronal level, these associations reflect 
sustained firing of neurons. Perner and Ruffman suggest that infants' 
increased 'looking' times may merely reflect the processing of new 
associations or, alternatively, may reflect the encoding of recent versus 
latent information. 
2.2.5 Summary 
To summarize, social understanding consists of several different 
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knowledge. In this thesis, I will focus only on certain aspects of social 
understanding namely, child mental state language and emotion 
understanding. The reason for focusing on these two components is that 
my interest is in early developing social understanding (prior to false belief 
understanding) and also given time constraints and infants' limited 
attention, it was not possible to test everything in young children. 
2.3 Theories of theories of mind 
As outlined above, a theory of mind might contain a number of 
different mental states or components. Other questions, however, concern 
the ways in which these components might be organized, the way they 
might arise, and the precise way in which children might reflect on others' 
minds. There are several approaches that attempt to answer these 
questions. 
2.3.1 Theory-theories 
One influential stance takes as its model of cognitive development 
the notion that children's understanding of the mind (folk psychology) is 
analogous to the development of a scientific theory. Based on original 
work by philosophers working within the philosophy of science ( e.g., 
Popper, Kuhn), some have argued that children's theory of mind is akin to 
a scientific theory. The essence of this framework lies in the structural, 
functional and dynamic components that define a theory (Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1997). In addition, theories are abstract entities or laws that are 
used to explain and predict evidence. They are also coherent, in that the laws 
governing various aspects of a theory are structured so that they relate to 
one another. Theories are also dynamic and are thus subject to change 
based on counterfactual evidence. With this framework in mind, 
conceptual changes in children's understanding of desires, beliefs and 
knowledge, evidenced in their differential success on various tasks that tap 
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representational "theory-of-mind". There are a number of different strands 
of the theory-theory. 
Josef Ferner 
Ferner (1991) argues that children move from explaining behaviour 
on the basis of what they know to be true about the world, to the idea that 
people may behave under a false notion of the state of the world or a 'false 
belief' (Wimmer & Ferner, 1983). 
Ferner (1991) explains this conceptual shift in children's explanatory 
powers in terms of a change in children's representational abilities. In this 
view children are hypothesised to move from a single updating model of 
reality in which only the current reality can be represented, to the ability to 
conceive of multiple models of reality ( e.g., the child's desire versus 
someone else's desire), which would emerge around 18 months when 
children begin to engage in pretend play, and talk more about desires. To 
illustrate using children's developing understanding of desire, being able 
to entertain multiple models of reality may enable children to mentally 
represent desires, rather than simply treating desires as 'relations to 
desired situations' (Ferner, 1991, page 205). This change in representational 
capacity enables children to understand that not only may desires differ 
between people, but also that they may change. 
Ferner (1991) has also argued that children's demonstrations of 
empathy around the second year of life indicate an emerging 
understanding of emotions as 'mental'. In Perner's view, the transition to 
'mental' entails an understanding that emotions refer to inner experiences, 
act as "a theoretical construct for understanding another's distress" and are 
intentional by virtue of their relation to other mental states such as desires, 
thoughts and knowledge. Children feel empathic toward one in distress 
because, with multiple models, they can now conceive of how a situation 
causes another person to feel sad, even though the situation does not make 
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able to have multiple models to understanding a model (representation) as 
a representation. For example, in understanding false belief children must 
represent the protagonist's representation of reality (the false belief), and 
understand this as a representation (i.e., must metarepresent). 
Henry Wellman 
Along similar theoretical lines, Wellman (1988, 1990) suggests that 
the central tenet in children's 'theory of mind' is a 'belief-desire' psychology . 
On Wellman's account, older 2-year-olds start by viewing their social 
world in terms of a simple desire psychology. At this age, Wellman 
contends that most of children's social understanding centers around 
people's desires and not on their thoughts and knowledge. Thus, in a 
simple desire psychology (as described above in section 2.2.2), an older 2-
year-old child may accurately predict that a person will stop looking for an 
object once they have found it and will feel happy. Where a simple desire 
psychology falls short is when a child needs to reason about the person's 
beliefs in order to accurately predict their desires, e.g., she wants bananas, 
she thinks bananas are in the red cup board (bananas are actually in the 
blue cupboard), so where will she look? Using only a simple-desire 
psychology, a child will inaccurately predict where a person will search, 
because the child will reason using their knowledge about the banana's 
location (true state of the world). In this case, children need to move 
beyond their own knowledge about objects and events and frame another's 
desire using that person's beliefs about objects and events. Wellman 
proposes, in keeping with the notion that children's social understanding is 
comprised of a number of inter-related theories, that 3-year-old children 
begin to think about others' behaviour in terms of their beliefs and their 
desires when they come across unexplainable events ( e.g., discovering that 
others may not like the same food that the child likes). This new naYve 
theory (desire-belief theory) allows children to occasionally appeal to others' 
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unaware of the power of this new theory. Evidence for this theory as a 
precursor to the fuller belief-desire theory is found in children's talk about 
desires, then beliefs, and eventually their talk about false beliefs (Bartsch & 
Wellman, 1995). 
2.3.2 Modularity theories 
Alan Leslie 
In direct contrast to the notion that social understanding may develop 
as a representational theory of mind, modular accounts propose that the 
capacity to interpret people's behaviour as mentally construed is innate. 
Such accounts employ information processing models based on the 
concepts of modularity (i.e., have restrictions in information flow, are 
encapsulated, fast, domain-specific, Fodor, 1983). 
One of the key problems identified by Leslie in trying to understand 
how children interpret the social world, is how children manage to attend 
to such abstract entities as mental states. Leslie asks "How is the young 
brain able to attend to mental states when mental states cannot be seen, 
heard, or felt? I call this the fundamental problem of "theory of mind" 
because if the child cannot attend to mental states, then how can he or she 
learn about them?" (Leslie, 2000, page 1235, emphasis in original). Leslie's 
solution to this problem is to propose that children are endowed with a 
piece of cognitive architecture known as the Theory of Mind Mechanism 
(ToMM), which deploys metarepresentations (M-representations) of mental 
states such as pretence, belief and desire. The mode of operation of such a 
mechanism is inherently supported by the 'principle' that people act to 
satisfy their desires on the basis of their beliefs (Leslie, Friedman, & 
German, 2004). Thus, the role of this mechanism is to 'direct attention to 
otherwise unattendable mental states and thus promotes learning' (Leslie, 
2000, page 1238). 
There are two points of difference in Leslie's theory compared to 
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components of children's. social understanding are innate or genetically 
endowed. Consequently, Leslie is particularly interested (especially most 
recently) in how a cognitive architecture allows for the development of 
'belief', which he sees as pivotal to children's mind understanding. In 
addition, he believes the particular cognitive processes that specify social 
understanding are domain-specific and therefore are not shared with other 
types of cognitive processing ( e.g., general learning). As a result, Leslie's 
account is at odds with others who prefer to look at social understanding in 
infancy as initially more dependent on general learning mechanisms 
(Moore & Corkum, 1994; Perner & Ruffman, 2005). An advantage of his 
account in Leslie's view is that impairment in the ToM module can explain 
the selective impairment in social understanding found in autism. Leslie 
argues that if social understa~ding is based on a general theory of 
representational development then children with autism should be equally 
impaired on tasks tapping representation even when the tasks don't 
require an understanding of mental representation. As evidence for his 
view, he discusses the dissociation in performance on false-belief versus 
out-of-date photos (Zaitchik, 1990). Autistic children do better on the out-
of-date photo task, thereby providing evidence that the difficulty they 
experience on false-belief tasks results from an impairment of the module 
concerned with social understanding in particular. 
In conjunction with the modular component of mind understanding, 
Leslie also proposes another non-modular penetrable mechanism called the 
selection processor (SP) (Leslie & Thaiss, 1992) The purpose of this 
processor is to inhibit true belief default settings so that other types of 
belief scenarios can be entertained, e.g., false beliefs. Inhibition takes place 
by reducing the saliency of true beliefs and providing false beliefs as viable 
alternatives. Children's ability to cope with false-belief explanations at 4 
years depends on the degree to which the selection processor has matured, 
and in particular, on their ability to inhibit reality. Leslie suggests that as 
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default settings (Leslie et al., 2004). It seems therefore, that despite strongly 
arguing for a domain-specific module, dedicated to mind understanding, the 
SP is a more malleable mechanism, which directly influences performance 
and is thus open to more general maturational developments. 
The focus of Leslie's theory is largely based around the development 
of belief, a feature of older children's theory of mind. Other researchers 
such as Baron-Cohen have built on Leslie's theory by proposing additional 
developmentally earlier mechanisms which feed into the basic ToMM 
(Baron-Cohen, 1994). Baron-Cohen's theoretical model includes the 
Intentionality Detector (ID), the Eye-Direction Detector (EDD) and the 
Shared Attention Mechanism (SAM). These first two modules build dyadic 
representations of behaviour such as the intentional reading of actions as 
goals and representations of eye behaviour as 'look' or 'see'. The ID and 
the EDD feed into the SAM forming triadic representations, which coordinate 
dyadic representations, such that eye-direction is read in terms of an 
agent's intentions and desires. At this point, the SAM coordinates with 
Leslie's ToMM (above) to trigger or deploy the necessary mental states. 
2.4 Simulation theories 
Paul Harris 
Alternative theoretical explanations for social understanding have 
proposed that children's developing understanding of the mind arises from 
an improvement in their ability to simulate or imagine a person's desires, 
thoughts, or knowledge (Harris 1991, 1993; Johnson 1988). Rather than 
formulate theories about people's behaviours based on their mental states, 
simulationists argue that children will interpret others' mental states on the 
basis of simulating within a current reality. To use desire as an example, 
the simulation is purported to work from the basis of the child's own 
default settings of their current intentional stance towards the desired 
object or state of affairs and the current state of the world as known to the 
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regarding the world), the child is able to predict how a person will behave 
towards a certain desired object. For example, if a person smiles towards a 
piece of broccoli, the child over-rides her default setting which specifies her 
attitude towards broccoli (loathing) and simulates how wanting a piece of 
broccoli would lead one to seek broccoli. The more default settings the 
child needs to over-ride, the more complex the simulation. For example, if 
a child observes a person reaching for something which they mistakenly 
think is something else, not only do they need to simulate the person's 
desire towards this object but also the person's belief regarding the object's 
identity. In this case it is both the desire (e.g., for broccoli) and the belief 
( e.g., that it is broccoli) that lead the person to reach for something that is 
in fact not broccoli. 
An important feature of simulation is that it operates on the basis of 
an analogical model of reasoning. That is, the child uses her own model of 
reality as a starting point from which to simulate others' realities. The 
degree to which children become better at over-riding default settings 
determines whether they can accurately interpret people's actions. 
2.4.1 Hybrid Theories 
More recently, some have suggested we use a combination of 
simulation and theory in understanding others. Nichols and Stich' s (2003) 
theory consists of a cognitive architectural model in which components of 
that model (e.g., desire module and belief module) are information rich 
(theoretical) but also operate using integrated and planned simulation. 
Their model consists of two systems: In their early mindreading 
system they have Desire Detection Mechanisms, which enable children to 
detect goal-directed behaviour and to allow them to formulate beliefs about 
others' desires. They propose that these mechanisms are partly innate but 
also that they are enriched by children's learning of the behavioural cues 
which are associated with various goals. Such desire attribution strategies 
include: detecting facial expressions, what target says, what others say 
( > 
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about target, and generalizing from one's own (self) behaviour to explain 
others' behaviour. The other component of this early system is the Planner. 
The Planner helps determine a plan of action, that is, helps determine how 
desires are best satisfied. The Planner works using a type of simulation in 
which the processing mechanism is taken off-line and pretend inputs are 
fed into the system. The final component is the Mindreading Coordinator, 
which generates predictions about the future behaviour of the target. The 
second system includes a mechanism for overriding default belief 
attributions (attributions the child would make by default), which enable 
the child to modify their default model of the target's beliefs. 
Plaut and Karmiloff-Smith (1993) propose a view that integrates all 
components of the three theories described above. The main idea is that 
children's capacity to deal with conflicting evidence (such as in a false 
belief task) depends on the gradual development of their symbolic 
representations, which can over-ride conflicting perceptual experiences. 
Thus, children use simulation to the extent that they gradually understand 
intentionality through experience but alongside the increasing capacity to 
use symbolic representations. Language development is critical in this 
regard in that it supports symbolic representation, thus over-riding any 
conflict with direct perceptual experience. 
2.4.2 Summary 
The theories described above provide closely articulated views on 
the internally driven development of a child's social cognition, whether it 
be through a developing representational capacity, an innate modular 
system, or simulation ability. The point of difference in these theories is the 
extent to which they assign a role to learning and social experience in the 
development of social understanding. In the following section I consider 
another group of theories that focus on children's developing social 
cognition from the standpoint of their social experience rather than their 
individual mental state development. 
.( ·' 
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2.4.3 Social-constructivist views 
The most extreme social-constructivist viewpoint is expressed by 
Katherine Nelson who claims that: "the individual child constructs 
representations - of the real experience world, of desired states, of pretend worlds, 
of others' worlds - and that these representations are from the beginning 
constructed in collaboration with social others, adults and peers" (Nelson, 1996, 
page 351). Specifically, children construct representations of their world 
with the support of the structured environment provided by caregivers. 
This may begin in the early stages through shared mimetic activities 
evident in early play, which help children understand the roles and 
perspectives of different social participants. As children get older and they 
acquire language, they are now in a position to gain knowledge about their 
own mental states and also others' mental states. What is central to 
Nelson's ideas is that the enculturation process the child engages in allows 
her to achieve through language II shared meanings of the community". 
Other researchers such as Carpendale and Lewis (2004) have 
distinguished their own social-constructivist theory from the notion of 
'passive enculturation' (i.e., the passive adoption of cultural norms). They 
state that "concepts of the mind are not just passed on from the social group, nor 
are they completely formed by individual child-theorists. Instead, children 
gradually construct social understanding through the regularities they experience 
in interacting with others" (Carpendale & 'Lewis, 2004, page 84). This view 
focuses on the triadic relationship between the child, others and an object. 
Central to this theory is the idea that children gradually learn through 
practical experience (rather than theoretical formulation) about their 
relationship to people and objects. Within the first year of life, children 
develop shared social practices, such as joint attention, pointing, 
requesting, which facilitate the early stages of social understanding. These 
precursors then support the development of language, which in turn assists 
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Along these lines, socio-pragmatic views suggest that children who 
engage more frequently, and in qualitatively better, linguistically mediated 
social situations are assisted in their learning of others' minds. These ideas 
are brought into focus most clearly in studies of deaf children's theory of 
mind abilities, in which signing deaf children who have been brought up in 
signing homes had better theory of mind abilities than signing deaf 
children born to hearing parents (Peterson & Siegal, 1999). What this social 
interaction affords is the understanding of perspective, specifically, that the 
perspective required to understand others' points of view is linguistically 
mediated. Similar views are expressed by Harris (1996) and Lohmann, 
Tomasello and Meyer (2005) who suggest that the perspective-shifting role 
of conversation helps children to learn about the mental states of others. 
Thus, much of the theoretical framing of this research can be broadly 
viewed within Vygotsky's thesis that society and culture play an important 
role in facilitating the acquisition of higher order mental functioning 
(Astington, 1996; Vygotsky, 1978). In particular, the cooperative task of 
conversation enables the child to internalise ways of thinking through 
exposure to conversation about mental states and 'thinking' with adult 
partners (Symons, 2004; Nelson, 1996). Indeed, research with older 
preschoolers suggests that parental use of mental state language plays an 
important role in the development of false-belief (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; 
Meins & Fernyhough, 1999; Ruffman et al., 2002), emotion (Dunn et al., 
1991), and general theory-of-mind (Ruffman et al., 2002) understanding. I 
consider in more detail the role of mental and non-mental state language 
input in the next chapter. 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
To summarise, social understanding in children consists of several 
components, typically assumed under the rubric of a 'theory of mind' and a 
variety of theories have been proposed to account for children's developing 
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language plays in facilitating children's social understanding, with 
particular focus on the role of maternal input. I consider how maternal 
input might relate to children's developing social understanding, 
specifically their use of mental state language and their understanding of 
emotion). I also propose a hypothesis for how maternal input and 
children's social understanding fits into the theoretical landscape described 
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Neither can embellishments of language be found without arrangement and expression of 
thoughts, nor can thoughts be made to shine without the light of language. 
Cicero 
"Talking helps me think" 
Gabrielle (aged 5) to Mia (aged 5) 
Chapter 3 The Role of Language 
in the Development of Social 
Understanding 
When one thinks about the mind, and refers to another's mind it 
seems impossible to do so without language. This has led many 
researchers to consider more deeply the influence language has on a child's 
developing conceptual understanding of the mind. 
The overarching aim of this chapter is to present a theoretical 
framework for how maternal language of the mind assists in children's 
later social understanding. To this end, I present three aims: (1) to 
examine studies which address the relation between children's developing 
linguistic competence and theory of mind; (2) to examine language contexts 
which could account for individual variation in children's social 
understanding; (3) to identify social and cognitive mechanisms which may 
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3.1 Is there a relationship between children's 
language ability and social understanding? 
Converging evidence from a wide range of studies attests to a clear 
relation between a child's language ability and social understanding (see 
Astington & Baird, 2005 for summaries). Cross-sectional correlational 
studies indicate that general language ability, as indexed by a variety of 
measures such as the Test of Early Language Development (TELD), verbal 
subsection of the Stanford-Binet IQ test, the Peabody Picture Vocabulary 
Test (PPVT) and the Bus story, co-varies with false-belief task performance 
(Jenkins & Astington, 1996) as well as emotion understanding (Cutting & 
Dunn, 1999). Furthermore, certain longitudinal studies also suggest a 
causal role for language, in that measures of children's general and mental 
state language correlated with later measures of social understanding, 
including false-belief tasks and emotion understanding tasks (Astington & 
Jenkins, 1999; de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Ruffman et al., 2002; Ruffman et al., 
2003). Therefore, although it is clear that a child's linguistic competence 
relates to children's performance on social understanding tasks, researchers 
differ in their theoretical interpretation of the mechanism underlying this 
relation. To follow, I will consider in some detail theoretical explanations 
and corresponding empirical evidence for such a relation. 
3.1.1 Lingui~tic determinism 
There are two versions of the view that language plays a role in the 
development of social understanding. The first view is that syntactic 
competence in general assists in theory-of-mind development (Astington & 
Jenkins, 1999). They argue that the syntactic or structural components of 
language help the child to keep track of the conflicting perceptual reality 
(what the child knows to be true) and another's representation of reality 
(what another thinks to be true). Evidence for the relation between 
syntactic ability and children's false-belief understanding comes from a 
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language (TELD) and false belief (unexpected transfer and appearance 
reality). Children's syntactic (rather than semantic) ability as measured on 
the TELD contributed independently to children's later false-belief task 
performance. Yet Ruffman et al. (2003) argue that Astington and Jenkins 
~ -a-id not really dissociate syntax from semantics in the test items. Therefore, 
their study leaves open the question of whether both types of language are 
influential for later false-belief understanding. 
The second view is that children's ability to use syntax and 
semantics is important for understanding false belief. In English, mental 
state verbs such as think and believe are special in that they take a tensed 
complement, ( e.g., she thinks that the flower is red) and mastery of these 
syntactic constructions occurs around 4 years. De Villers and Pyers (2002) 
and Hale and Tager-Flusberg (2003) argue for a causal relation between the 
acquisition of object and sentential complements and the development of 
false-belief understanding, such that the embedded proposition allows 
children to represent the different spatial arrangements found in a false 
belief test. Therefore, in using an object complement, children are 
maintaining the overall truth-value of the sentence while asserting a false 
proposition (Maxi thinks that the chocolate is in the box). de Villiers and 
Pyers claim that it is this ability to take prepositional attitudes which 
enables a child to represent states that are different from reality, (e.g., belief 
or desire about a proposition). 
Evidence for this view comes from a longitudinal study ( de Villiers 
& Pyers, 2002) in which children's memory for tensed complements was 
related to children's later theory of mind. Hale and Tager-Flusberg (2003) 
also provide evidence that training in sentential complements increased 
scores on false-belief tasks and not vice versa. However evidence against 
an exclusive role for sentential complements can be found in the German 
language, in which sentences containing 'want' must take (like belief) a 
'that' complement (e.g., she wants that Andrew goes to bed). Ferner, 








CHAPTER 3: LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING 33 
taking the same complement structure to 'think', German-speaking 
children perform significantly better in tasks which require them to 
remember or infer something that a person wanted as opposed to 
something they said or thought. Furthermore, in a different training study, 
4-year-old children improved in their false belief understanding not only 
when they were trained in the syntax of sentential complements but also 
when trained in non-mental state discourse which highlighted the 
deceptive nature of objects (Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). 
3.1.2 Both syntax and semantics assist theory of mind 
Other researchers have argued that language in general (that is both 
syntactic and semantic competence) assists children's theory of mind by 
acting as a representational symbolic medium that enables them to make 
explicit, underlying implicit theories about the mind. In a critique of 
Astington and Jenkins (1999), who argued that syntax specifically assisted 
theory of mind (see above), Ruffman et al. (2003) found that both general 
measures of syntax and semantics rather than syntax specifically, related to 
children's theory of mind task performance, when children's syntax versus 
semantics was assessed more stringently. Children's general language skill 
evolves through conversations with their parents (Huttenlocher, Haight, 
Bryk, Seltzer, & Lyons, 1991; Snow & Ferguson, 1977; Weizman & Snow, 
2001). Parent-child conversations facilitate child language (syntactic and 
semantic development) but also teach them directly about mental states 
when parents use mental state language (e.g., Ruffman et al., 2002). It isn't 
clear, therefore, whether it is the general language that helps theory of 
mind, or the equally developing mental state knowledge children acquire· 
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3.2 The relation between language in the child's 
environment and the development of social 
understanding 
The first two views described above - child syntax as a facilitator of 
theory of mind versus general language as a facilitator - take as their initial 
stand point the developing linguistic abilities of the child in relation to their 
developing social understanding. Another view emphasizes the mental 
and non-mental state language that children encounter in their social 
environment and how this might facilitate theory of mind. 
Parents use 1rnernal---matererms-wnen-s-p-e-akirrg-tu-their-chi-I-dren-----~--
from a very young age. Desire language such as 'want'· is the most 
frequently used term (Smiley & Huttenlocher, 1989), with references to 
'think' and 'know' increasing with age (Beeghly, Bretherton, & Mervis, 
1986; Ruffman e! al., 2002), although the proportion of desire terms to think 
and know terms may vary considerably for individual children (Bartsch & 
Wellman, 1995). References to pleasure and distress are the most 
frequently occurring emotion terms (Brown & Dunn, 1991; Dunn et al., 
1987; Dunn et al., 1991; Smiley & Huttenlocher, 1989). Given that 
caregivers talk about mental states to their children from a very young age, 
the relation of this talk to the later acquisition of mental state language and 
social understanding is of interest. I first consider the relation between 
mother mental state talk and later social understanding in older children. 
In line with the general definition of social understanding, the studies 
reported examine a range of aspects of social understanding including false 
belief, emotion understanding, and mental state language. 
3.2.1 Maternal input and theory of mind in older 
children 
Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla and Y oungblade (1991) 
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language directed at 3-year-old children (in a naturalistic home context) 
and recognition of emotion in an affective-perspective taking task three 
years later. This relation was independent of children's initial language 
levels, as measured by mean length of utterance (MLU) and the frequency 
of overall mother talk. What this study does not report is the relation 
between caregiver use of emotion and feeling language and later child 
success on the emotion task after partialling out child feeling talk at Time 1. 
As child feeling state talk at Time 1 was found to be a correlate of later 
success on the emotion understanding task, it is plausible that the relation 
between mother emotion language and later child emotion understanding 
is not a unique relation (i.e., is mediated by children's Time 1 talk about 
feelings). 
References to specific mental state terms have also predicted later 
child performance on theory of mind tasks (Ruffman, et al., 2002). In this 
study, mothers' use of 'think' and 'know', modulations of assertions, and 
desire terms directed at 3-year-olds, correlated with later performance on 
theory of mind tasks. Additionally, although this study showed that 
mother mental state language in general related to a child's later mental 
state language, the unique variance attributed to individual mental state 
terms on child mental state language was not reported. 
Furthermore, the measure of children's mental state language was 
taken within the context of mother-child talk, and therefore it is difficult to 
remove the reciprocal influence of mother talk about the mind and a child's 
talk about the mind. 
In much older children, de Rosnay, Pons, Harris, et al. (2004) found 
a relation between the proportion of mental attributes mothers used when 
describing their children (presumably reflecting a propensity to talk more 
about the mind) and children's ability to pass tasks tapping belief-based 
emotion understanding. Nevertheless, in this study measures of mother 
and child language were taken at the same time point so that the direction 
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aspects of the child's language abilities may affect the way mothers talk 
about their children. As Harris (2005) points out, however, examining 
mothers' tendency to talk about the mind outside of the communicative 
context in which children's mental state language is assessed, provides 
additional validating information about mothers' propensity to talk about 
the mind in general and children's later social understanding. In 
explaining the finding, Harris (2005, p.72) appeals to a pragmatic 
explanation in which "mothers disposed to talk about varying individual 
beliefs regarding a given situation will probably also articulate the feelings 
that flow from those individual beliefs". 
3.2.2 Maternal input and theory of mind in younger 
children 
Meins et al. (2003) examined maternal language directed to babies. 
They found that mothers' 'appropriate' (that is comments which accurately 
reflected the child's mental states) but not inappropriate mind-minded 
comments to 6-month-olds, predicted child performance on a false belief 
task at 45 to 48 months of age. Such a relation, however, may not be 
unique in that mothers' mind-minded comments in combination with non-
mind-minded comments (which were not reported), could also be 
indicative of a mother's propensity to engage in conversation, which in 
turn may be facilitative in developing an awareness of others' minds 
(Harris, 1996). 
Other research has examined the relation between mother mental 
state language to young children and later emotion understanding. 
Beeghly et al. (1986) found a positive relation between the frequency of 
mother internal state language (six categories including perception, 
physiology, affect, moral judgment/ obligation, cognition, volition/ ability) 
at 13 and 20 months, and child mental state language, child general 
language understanding (PPVT), and performance on the emotion 
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mother internal state language correlated with children's later general 
language ability, it is difficult to specify a unique relation between mother 
internal state language and later child mental state language. This thesis 
examines this issue more closely. 
3.2.3 The role of siblings and theory of mind 
development 
Further evidence that the input children receive is important for 
later social understanding comes from studies which show a relation 
between birth order and false-belief tasks (Brown, Donelan-McCall, & 
Dunn, 1996; Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Perner, Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994; 
Ruffman, Ferner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 1998). Although there is some 
f 
dispute over whether this effect is only found with older siblings or both 
older and young siblings (Peterson, 2000), what is clear is that irrespective 
of a child's language ability, siblings account for additional variance in 
false-belief understanding, although the effect appears stronger when 
children have poorer language (Jenkins & Astington, 1996). Thus, the 
important theoretical contribution these studies make is that sibling talk 
potentially assists in developing representational capacity by providing 
contexts such as conversation or pretend play in which the vast majority of 
mental state talk between peers and siblings occurs (Brown et al., 1996), 
which highlight the differences between thoughts, knowledge and desires. 
Maternal responses to children's arguments also provide opportunities to 
highlight differences in view and causes of disagreements underlying these 
attitudes (although see Cutting & Dunn, 1999 and Cole & Mitchell, 2000 for 
evidence that such tendencies may be specific to mothers in higher socio-
economic groups). 
3.2.4 Is there something special about mental state 
versus non-mental state language? 
The studies described above provide persuasive evidence for a 





CHAPTER 3: LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING 38 
children's social understanding. Given however, that parental input has 
been shown to relate closely to the order of acquisition of children's general 
vocabulary items (Huttenlocher et al., 1991), this begs the question of 
whether children's acquisition of mental state terms differs from that of 
their non-mental state vocabulary. Of particular interest, therefore, is the 
effect of other types of mother talk on a child's later social understanding. 
This is difficult to test since other measures of mother language linked to 
child false belief understanding have often likely contained references to 
mental states, e.g., causal talk and quantity of talk (Dunn et al., 1991). 
Ruffman et al. (2002) did examine mothers' non-mental state 
language with 3-year-olds, such as causal talk, factual talk and linking talk 
(linking pictures to the child's own life). They found that these three types 
of mother talk did relate to later child theory of mind even after accounting 
for theory-of-mind performance at the earlier time point, but not after 
accounting for mother mental state talk at the earlier time point. In 
contrast, after accounting for early mother non-mental state talk, mothers' 
mental state talk was still highly correlated with children's later theory of 
mind. 
3.2.5 The relation between mother theory of mind 
ability and children's theory of mind ability 
3.2.6 Summary 
Taken together, the studies described in section 3.2 suggest that 
although there is clearly some relation between mother talk about mental 
states to young children and a variety of measures of social understanding 
including, emotion understanding, false belief and mental state language, it 
is not always clear what mechanisms drive such a relation. Below I 
describe and evaluate in more detail various proposals in the literature, 
which attempt to elucidate the precise nature of the relation between 
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Social and cognitive mechanisms underlying 
the relation between mother mental state input and 
later child social understanding 
3.3.1 Mind-mindedness: Elizabeth Meins 
The central focus to Meins' thesis is the concept that the 
development of intentionality in children is aided by mothers' 'proclivity to 
treat one's child as an individual with a mind' (Meins & Fernyhough, 1999 
p.363). Termed mind-mindedness, this concept arose out of earlier findings 
that individual differences in mothers' propensity to treat their children's 
early vocalizations as meaningful or to describe their children in 
mentalistic terms, related to young children's early vocalizations and 
performance on a false belief and emotion task (Meins, 1998; Meins & 
Fernyhough, 1999). This concept of mind-mindedness has proved to be 
extremely helpful for conceptualizing ways in which early input from 
mothers can affect children's later social understanding. Indeed, as 
described above, studies with infants have shown a relation between 
mothers' appropriate mind-mindedness at 6 months (comments which 
accurately reflect the child's mind) and children's later false belief 
performance. Furthermore, in a pathway analysis of her findings, Meins et 
al. (2003), showed that the relation between mothers' mind-minded 
comments to infants and their theory of mind ability at 48 months was 
direct, that is, not mediated by mothers' later mind-minded comments 
about their child (at 48 months). Indeed, mother mind-minded comments 
used to describe their children at 48 months did not predict children's 
theory of mind ability. 
Meins (2002) has suggested that the way in which mind-mindedness 
may affect later representational capacity is that it may reflect a 'scaffolding 
context' (p. 1724) in which infants' behaviour is connected to mental state 
comments which bootstrap infants' understanding of others in mentalistic 
ways. One important issue is to link Meins' findings of a relation between 
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mother appropriate mind-minded comments and later theory of mind1 
with the findings that mother mental state talk with 3-year-olds helps later 
theory of mind performance (described above). Examining this transition 
may help may yield clues to how mother input may scaffold a child1 s 
developing capacity to represent others1 thoughts and beliefs. Thus1 for 
example1 individual differences in maternal mind-mindedness (at a time 
when children are not using language) may persist as the child becomes 
more linguistically able1 but become manifested in other contexts such as 
mother-child conversations. Moreover1 mothers
1 mind-minded and non-
mind-minded comments might reflect a general tendency to talk and 
engage in conversations with their child. Such conversations have been 
highlighted by Harris (1996; 2005) as an avenue through which children 
can learn about the mind. I discuss these ideas in the next section. 
3.3.2 Conversation and points-of-view: Paul Harris 
(1996) 
The focus of Harris1 thesis is that developing conversational skills 
enable the child to move from initially viewing people as 'agents with 
goals' to being 'epistemic subjects capable of exchanging information for 
the formation and updating of beliefs' (Harris, 19961 p. 209). Although this 
view is one in which the child is driving the course of change1 it does 
highlight an important aspect of the input and that is conversation. Harris 
states: " .. . conversational discourse can be a vehicle for conveying the fact that 
people differ in their point of view and in the information that they have available 
to them1 irrespective of whether a particular party to the conversation makes any 
explicit lexical reference to any given mental state." (Harris, 2005, page 75). 
Harris' ideas developed in response to the observed lag in children 
understanding desire before belief (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). Along 
similar lines1 Lohmann and Tomasello (2003) demonstrated in a training 
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exposure to perspective shifting discourse which did not include mental 
state verbs ( e.g., What is this? What is it really? Right it is a Y). 
~ 
How does one reconcile the importance of other points-of-view as 
afforded by conversation for the development of beliet with the findings of 
those such as Meins et al. (2002) that language directed at very young 
children assists in later false-belief understanding? Recall that Meins et al. 
(2002) found that mothers' comments to infants were made when infants 
were 6 months of age, at a time when they were not able to engage in 
conversation. Thus, appropriate mind-mindedness could be construed as 
comi-nents, which reflect the child's point of view, that is through the eyes 
of their mother. This alternative construal of mind-mindedness, (i.e., that it 
involves comments reflecting the child's point of view), may provide an 
explanation for why Meins was unable to find a persisting relation between 
later maternal mind-mindedness and social understanding when she 
examined maternal mind-minded comments at 48 months of age. It may 
be that only focusing on the child's points of view is less helpful and that 
focusing on the perspective of others becomes increasingly important for 
deepening social understanding. 
Below, I combine ideas from both Meins and Harris in proposing a 
theoretical framework in which I attempt to explain the development of 
maternal input as children grow older. 
3.4 Mother input as scaffolding 
In addressing the mechanism that underlies the relation between 
mother use of mental state language and children's later understanding of 
the mind, some researchers have referred to the scaffolding nature of 
mother talk about the mind (Fernyhough, 1996; Meins et al., 2002). Others 
have argued that mother talk about the mind introduces children to 
different perspectives on a single situation, which helps them to learn 
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gradually acquire a social understanding through their experience of social 
interaction (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004). 
The common thread in these ideas is their stress on the importance 
of social experience. I expand these ideas by proposing a theoretical 
framework that borrows from Vygotsky' s zone of proximal development 
and builds on current social-constructivist theorising (Astington, 1996; 
Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Symons, 2004). I will briefly summarise this 
position, then in the following sections I bring together the theoretical and 
empirical basis for these ideas. 
The first component to my proposal is that the incremental and 
differential exposure to specific mental states, first desire and then belief, 
allows the child to build on and deepen existing knowledge of their own 
and others' minds. The second component is that talk about the child's 
mental states is a crucial first step in introducing language about the mind 
before talk about others becomes important. The successful interplay of 
these two components depends critically on the zone of proximal 
development in that the advantage obtained from exposure to certain 
mental state terms, such as desires versus beliefs, and to the self before 
other, depends on the timing with the child's current level of mental 
understanding and conversational competence (Harris, 1996, 2005). 
Specifically, for children to receive maximum benefit from mother talk, the 
talk must be appropriately timed to fit with the child's existing 
understanding. When mothers' talk of this nature is initially introduced at 
a level above (but not too far above) the child's current level of 
understanding, it is most beneficial to the child ( and understood 
implicitly). As these concepts become internalized through increased 
exposure and through the child's use of such terms, the understanding 
becomes increasingly explicit. 
As discussed earlier in section 2.2.4, understanding of false belief 
may initially be implicit. Three-year-olds look to the correct location when 
anticipating a story character's return, yet incorrectly predict the location 
'( 
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the story character will return to when explicitly asked (Clements & Perner, 
1994; Garnham & Ruffman, 2001; Ruffman, Garnham, Import, & Connolly, 
2001). Such researchers have argued that children's initial understanding 
of mind is implicit, and that language enables explicit understanding ( e.g., 
Ruffman, 2000) and can make explicit the differences and similarities 
between self and other (Nelson, 1996). Similarly, researchers have argued 
that primates cannot have an explicit theory of mind because of their 
language deficit (Smith, 1996). 
3.4.1 The zone of proximal development: Vygotsky 
Vygotsky' s zone of proximal development has generally been 
conceptualised as a learning tool within a problem-solving paradigm. 
Caregivers scaffold the child's learning by providing alternative 
perspectives on achieving a task, which the child can readily assimilate in 
the quest of achieving a goal. Such caregiver' s collaboration allows the 
child to participate in problem solving which they later come to fully 
understand, that is, parents introduce concepts that are slightly above the 
child's ability (Rogoff & Wertsch, 1984; Vygotsky, 1978). A defining feature 
of Vygotsky' s theoretical constructs in general is that the direction in which 
children develop higher order mental processes arises initially at a social 
(or interpersonal) level before being internalized at an individual (or 
intrapersonal) level. For this reason, it seems reasonable to consider how 
mother talk within a social context could facilitate children's own 
understanding of the social world in general. 
With these ideas in mind, the zone of proximal development 
provides a basis for understanding how mothers' talk might help children 
learn about mental states. Caregivers scaffold the child's learning by 
introducing mental state concepts that are slightly above the child's ability. 
Thus, I suggest that mothers' responses to very young children's goal-
directed actions (e.g., reaching for a rattle) must also correspond with the 
appropriate level at which the child is operating. Typically, explicitly 
\ ·, 
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referring to desires that underlie such goals (e.g., "You want the rattle?") 
provides a more tangible reference to a common underlying mental state 
than would a reference to the child's knowledge or thinking in this instance 
(e.g., "You know about the rattle"). In addition, desires are often 
accompanied by facial expressions and actions making it easier to make 
inferences about others' desires than knowledge or beliefs (Bretherton & 
Beeghly, 1982). Furthermore, the infant's existence is mediated to a large 
extent by the ongoing fulfillment of desires, making desires highly salient 
to them. Therefore, although the mental state label which the mother 
provides may not necessarily assist the child at that moment in achieving 
the goal (e.g., reaching for a rattle), it establishes a bridge between the 
external world and the child's internal mental world such as their 
emotional responses (Meins et al., 2002; Vygotsky, 1978). 
Likewise, the idea that parents can assist learning by introducing 
concepts slightly above the child's ability would suggest that once talk 
about desires has been established, parents will identify that children will 
benefit more from talk about thoughts and knowledge. In line with these 
views, Brown and Dunn (1991) found that the nature of the conversational 
context in which children were exposed to desire terms (_e.g., 
didactic/ controlling, such as controlling the child's behaviour) was much 
more salient than the context for belief /knowledge terms (non-
controlling/ commentary, such as discussions or narratives). Without that 
added saliency of the pragmatic context, Brown and Dunn suggest this 
puts extra demands on the child's capacity to understand beliefs. 
3.4.2 Early Social Understanding: Why might 
exposure to desire initially be more important than exposure 
to thoughts and knowledge 
Many studies over the past 20 years attest to the young child's 
emerging understanding of the mind, for instance, as evidenced in their 
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mental states (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Shatz, Wellman, & Silber, 1983). A 
feature of this early mental understanding exemplified in various 
naturalistic and experimental conditions is the lag between a child's 
understanding of desire and belief. Not only is this evident in their use of 
desire and feeling language before think/know language (Bartsch & 
Wellman, 1995; Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Brown & Dunn, 1991), but also 
in their ability to predict how people will behave or feel based on their 
desires (Wellman & Woolley, 1990) and their ability to remember their own 
desires before their beliefs (Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991). Drawing on 
theoretical explanations for this phenomenon described in section 2.3, 
'theory-theories' suggest that desire is understood before belief because 
children do not need to understand desires as representations (Perner, 
1991; Wellman, 1990) and because children do not need to understand 
belief in order to successfully understand some desires (Wellman, 1990). In 
Perner' s terminology, understanding others' desires requires a transition 
from a single updating model of reality in which only the current reality 
can be represented, to the ability to conceive of multiple models of reality 
(e.g., the child's desire versus someone else's desire). The earliest age 
group examined in this study (15 months) would purportedly be around 
the transition period between these two systems. My interest is thus in 
how mother talk about desires first, and then beliefs next, can potentially 
play an important part in facilitating this transition. 
As outlined in the previous chapter, some of the earliest developing 
theory-of-mind insights include an understanding of intentions and goals, 
although it is not clear whether infants understand intentions/ goals as 
relations to objects/behavior (Gergely, 2003; Perner & Ruffman, 2005; 
Phillips & Wellman, in press; Ruffman & Perner, 2005) or mentalistically 
(Meltzoff, 1995; Woodward, Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001) (see section 
2.2.1 for discussion). Two possible hypotheses emerge from these alternate 
views of infants' early understanding of intention. The first hypothesis is 
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they relate to a situation, rather than as they relate to others' intentions, 
then mother desire talk may provide infants with their first implicit 
introduction to mental states. Alternatively, if infants initially understand 
others' goals as relating to mental states such as desires, then mother talk 
about desires may help deepen this already underlying implicit 
understanding. Desire talk ( e.g., "You want the rattle?") would help to 
provide a common underlying cause (wanting) for otherwise differing 
actions (e.g., reaching for a toy, looking unhappy when the toy is out of reach, 
crying when the toy falls from grasp, looking happy when obtaining a toy), 
which builds on an underlying appreciation of desire/intention. 
Consistent with these ideas, previous research demonstrates that 
caregiver use of desire terms (specifically 'want') is much more frequent 
than other internal state terms (Smiley & Huttenlocher, 1989), and 
references to 'think' and 'know' increase with age (Beeghly et al., 1986; 
Ruffman et al., 2002) although the proportion of desire terms to think and 
know terms may vary considerably for individual children (Bartsch & 
Wellman, 1995). References to pleasure and distress are the most 
frequently occurring emotion terms (Dunn et al., 1987; Brown & Dunn, 
1991; Dunn et al., 1991 Smiley & Huttenlocher, 1989). Furthermore, Bartsch 
and Wellman (1995) demonstrated that a mother's references to desire 
terms predicted a child's first references to belief. What I propose is critical 
is that the learning context that enables very young children to gain an 
implicit understanding of mental states occurs within children's very early 
action sequences. To follow, I expand on how operating within a zone of 
proximal development may assist in this transition between goal/ action-
directed behaviour and early appreciation of mental states. 
3.4.3 Referring style of mothers: The child versus 
others 
A potentially important feature of understanding the social world is 
the idea of self/ other equivalence (Moore, 1996); that is, in understanding 
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the psychological relations that exist between people and objects, one also 
understands that the desires, thoughts and feelings someone experiences 
are equally applicable to oneself. 
Most proponents of the theory-theory claim that young children are 
equally able to attribute mental states to themselves and to other people 
(Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1994). Evidence for this claim comes from the finding 
that children do equally well explaining or describing others' beliefs, 
desires or perceptions as they do their own such mental states (Wellman et 
al., 2001) An alternative view is that children understand the mind 
through simulation, that is, through imagining how they would feel if they 
were in another person's circumstances. One version of this view holds 
that children require privileged access to their own mental states before 
that knowledge can be used to predict others' mental states (Harris, 1991; 
Johnson, 1988). There are empirical precedents for these ideas in children's 
understanding of action verbs (Huttenlocher, Smiley, & Charney, 1983) and 
pretence (Mitchell & Neal, 2005) and in the relation between mirror self-
recognition, personal pronoun use, and pretend play involving others as 
well as self (Lewis & Ramsay, 2004). 
More recently, as described above, researchers have argued for some 
combination of simulation and theory in understanding others (Nichols & 
Stich, 2003). For these reasons, infants' insight into their own mental states 
might be particularly important, along with mothers' talk about the infants' 
( as opposed to others') mental states. There is another related reason for 
thinking that talk about the child's mental states will be particularly 
important in very early social understanding. As discussed above (section 
3.4), children's initial understanding of mind seems to be implicit. When 
children are very young, and language abilities are very rudimentary, 
mother talk about mental states might provide the first opportunity to begin 
to think explicitly about mental states such as desires or emotions. 
Moreover, when language is first beginning, talk about the infant's own 
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explicitly about the internal experiences associated with their desires or 
emotions. Again, talk about someone else's desires or emotions will only 
provide a means of labeling the other's facial expression or actions, but not 
a means of understanding the underlying mental states if infants have 
never connected their own such states with mental state words. Such an 
infant would have no reference point with which to understand that 
internal states accompany the mental state word mothers have used in 
conjunction with another person's facial expressions or actions. 
For these reasons, I propose that initially at least, before language 
has really become established, understanding the self (through mother talk 
about the child) is an important first step in understanding others' minds. 
Consistent with this idea is evidence that not only do young children talk 
more frequently about their own desires and emotions (Dunn et al., 1987; 
Smiley & Huttenlocher, 1989; Wellman, Harris, Banerjee, & Sinclair, 1995), 
but also that mother desire and emotion talk refers more frequently to the 
child's rather than others' mental states (Baldwin, 1991; Bates & Goodman, 
1999; Beeghly et al., 1986; Smiley & Huttenlocher, 1989; Dunn et al., 1987, 
Meins et al., 2002). Therefore, at an early age mothers' mental state 
language which takes the child as its referent provides a context in which 
children can begin to make connections between their behaviour and 
underlying mental states (Meins et al., 2002; Harris, 1996). 
3.4.4 Section Summary 
To reiterate, in line with the zone of proximal development, I 
suggest that with very young children who are just beginning to talk, 
mothers who refer to the child's rather than their own desires, emotions 
and thoughts will likely better engage the child at a level in which they can 
understand and participate in the conversation. As conversation develops, 
mothers' language becomes a tool helping children to deepen their mental 
state understanding through exposure to others' mental states. Thus, I 
argue that as children establish greater self-awareness and knowledge of 
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their own mental states, referring to others' mental states becomes 
important. This idea is consistent with evidence that mother talk about 
others' thoughts, feelings and desires increases from 24 months of age 
(Booth, Hall, Robison, & Kim, 1997; Brown & Dunn, 1991). It is also 
consistent with evidence that the presence of siblings relates to children's 
later success on theory of mind tasks, because siblings provide 
opportunities for children to learn how others' desires, thoughts and 
feelings may differ from their own. 
These ideas provide a framework for understanding why mothers 
and children talk more about the child initially, which until now has been 
unexplained or at least not linked to children's subsequent social 
understanding. They also help to flesh out social-constructivist views of 
how children might acquire a theory of mind ( e.g., Carpendale & Lewis, 
2004), and findings that most variance in false belief understanding is 
explained by environmental rather than genetic factors (Hughes et al., 
2005). If children's theory of mind is not innate, but is constructed through 
social experience, then an important question is whether they have to 
discern all structure in the social input they receive, or whether the input is 
partly structured for them. Mothers might provide much of the structure 
by talking mainly about the child's rather than others' mental states, and by 
talking about desires which are typically more salient for children than 
thoughts or knowledge and typically have a more obvious external 
manifestation (i.e., facial expression). If so, the onus on the child is reduced 
and learning about mental states becomes a more tractable problem. 
Furthermore, in this way the development of social understanding would 
parallel the child's general language development. Mothers also structure 
their general language input in that initial language ("motherese") is higher 
in pitch, includes many gestures ( e.g., pointing) when for instance labeling 
objects, includes exaggerated intonation contours, high affect, and greater 
articulation of vowels (e.g., see Snow & Ferguson, 1977). 
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3.5 Hypotheses 
In summary, the overarching aim of this study was to examine two 
hypotheses related to the zone of proximal development. First, I argue that 
the incremental and differential exposure to mental state language - first 
desires, then knowledge and thinking - during a child's early years, may 
reflect a zone of proximal development in which maternal talk about one 
type of mental state (such as desires or emotions), which emerges early, 
may assist in the understanding of other types of mental states as well as 
mental life in general. Second, I argue that references to the child's mental 
states are initially more important than references to others' mental states. 
3.6 Goals 
There were three goals in this study. I examined how the proportion 
of specific mental state terms (such as desires, emotions, 
thinking/knowing) mothers used differed at each time point and changed 
between 15, 24 and 33 months. Consistent with Vygotsky's "zone of 
proximal development" construct and with previous research (see above), I 
hypothesized that mothers would talk more frequently about desires when 
children were younger and that this would change over time, with talk 
about beliefs (thoughts and knowledge) increasing. This would be likely 
because, as mentioned above, the infant's existence is mediated to a large 
extent by the ongoing fulfillment of desires making desires highly salient to 
them, because desire talk in early infancy is often· accompanied by facial 
expressions and actions making it easier to make inferences about others' 
desires than knowledge or beliefs, because mother talk about desires is 
more frequent than other types of mother mental state talk, and because it 
might help scaffold already existing strengths in the child (see above). 
Second, I examined the relation between mother mental state 
language at · 15 and 24 months and two indices of child social 
understanding at 24 and 33 months (mental state language and emotion 
f 
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task performance), partialling out several potentially confounding 
variables including all earlier child language, mother socio-economic 
status, mother's own emotion understanding, and other types of mother 
language such as non-mental state language (Cutting & Dunn, 1999). I 
examined children's emotion task performance in addition to their mental 
state language because theory of mind has been operationalized using both 
types of measures (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995), because emotion is one of the 
earliest developing aspects of children's social understanding (see section 
2.2.3), and because I wanted to examine whether mother mental state 
language had a general relation to child language and task performance or a 
more specific relation to child mental state language. Furthermore, by 
partialling out mothers' own emotion task performance, I could examine 
whether it was truly the things mothers said that were related to child 
social understanding, or that mothers who used mental state language also 
had better social understanding themselves and passed this on to their 
children independently of the things they said. 
Third, I considered how mother mental state talk that refers to the 
child versus another person relates to children's later acquisition of mental 
state concepts. As stated above, there are reasons for thinking that talk 
about the child's mental states will be particularly important, especially for 
children between 15 and 24 months of age. When language is first 
beginning, mother talk about the infant's own mental states provides them 
with the opportunity to explicitly connect the internal experiences 
associated with their desires or emotions, and provides a label for these 
mental states. Furthermore, there are reasons for thinking that a transition 
in the referring style of mothers occurs during the early preschool years 
and that this transition is mediated to a large extent by the zone of 
proximal development and the language abilities of the child. As mothers 
recognize that children understand their own mental states, talk about 
others' mental states deepens children's social understanding through 
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For these reasons, I hypothesized that mother talk about others' mental 
states at 24 months of age would be more important for children's social 
understanding at 33 months of age. 
J 
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Chapter 4 Methods 
4.1 Introduction 
The study employed a longitudinal design in which mothers and their 
children were tested at a university research laboratory at 15 months (Time 1), 
24 months (Time 2) and 33 months of age (Time 3). At Times 1, 2 and 3 mothers 
described the same collection of pictures to their child and the child's general 
and mental state vocabulary was assessed via a checklist. In addition, at Times 
2 and 3, children were administered two emotion tasks as well as a 
standardized language assessment (see Table 4.1 below). At Time 1, testing 
took place over two sessions while at Times 2 and 3 only one testing session 
was required. 
Table 4.1. Child and mother tasks given at Time 1, Time 2 and Time 3 
Time 1 Time 2 
Mother and Picture book task Picture book task 
child 
Child MCDI: Words and gestures MCDI: Words and 
sentences 
Mother Emotion face - emotion 
sound 
Emotion face - emotion 
written word 
Emotion situation task 
Body emotion task 
Time 3 





Body emotion task 
Note. MCDI refers to the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventories. RDLS refers to 
the Reynell Developmental Language Scales. 
4.2 Participants 
Parents agreed at the birth of their child to participate in any Early 
Learning Project studies. Seventy-nine infants and their mothers or fathers 
y 
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were recruited by phone to participate in this particular study. Three mothers 
did not return the MCDI reports, and two did not attend Time 2 testing. Of the 
remaining 74 children, there were 71 mother-infant pairs and three father-infant 
pairs (41 infant males and 33 females). At Time 3, a further two families left the 
area, reducing the sample to 72 (38 boys versus 34 girls). The mean age at Time 
1 was 14.8 months (range= 14.3 -15.8 months), at Time 2, 24.2 months (range 
= 23.3 - 26.8 months) and at Time 3, 32.8 months (range= 31.2 - 34.5). Infants 
were primarily of European descent (70 infants), and the mothers were of 
mixed socio-economic status (SES: see page 63 below). Mothers were 
reimbursed for their travel expenses, and the infants received a small gift. 
4.3 Materials and procedure 
4.3.1 Picture-book task. 
Mothers were asked to engage in a short picture describing session with 
their children. In order to allow the task to take place over two sessions for the 
youngest age group, two books were created containing a total of 30 
photographs. In total, the books contained 18 pictures depicting people and 
children expressing a range of emotions and 12 pictures depicting people and 
animals. Some examples of the pictures are as follows: a girl and mother 
feeding ducks at the park, a girl pushing a kitten in a toy shopping basket, a girl 
in a swimming pool with an angry expression on her face, a boy clapping his 
hands after building a tower of blocks (see Appendix A for a complete 
description of the pictures). 
At Time 1, mothers described the books at separate sessions (no longer 
than 2 weeks apart), whereas at Times 2 and 3 mothers described both books 
during the same session. Once the mother and infant were seated in a 
comfortable chair, the experimenter said, "Describe the pictures to your child as 
if you were at home reading a story. I will leave the room while you describe 
the pictures. When you get to the end of the book I will come back". A small 
microphone was attached to the mother's collar and the audio recording of the 
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narrative was transcribed and scored later by two coders. Parents stopped 
reading when they reached the end of the book or the child refused to continue. 
4.3.2 Child language: MCDI Time 1. 
At Time 1, the mothers were asked to fill out the MacArthur 
Communicative Development Inventory (MCDI) (Penson et al. 1993): Words 
and Gestures checklist. They were asked to indicate whether their child 
understood and/ or produced any of the listed words. In addition, a 
supplementary checklist of internal state words adapted from Bretherton and 
Beeghly (1982), Ridgeway et al. (1985) and Ruffman et al. (2002) was included 
as part of the general MCDI checklist . For Time 1 this included an extra 58 
terms, referring to mental states, physical states, emotions and the senses (see 
Appendix B for a complete list). 
4.3.3 Child language: MCDI Time 2. 
Similarly, at Time 2, mothers were asked to indicate on the MCDI: Words 
and Sentences checklist and the mental state checklist the words their child 
produced. In addition, a further 25 supplementary mental state terms 
including cognitive and modulation of assertion terms were also included (see 
Appendix C for a complete list). 
4.3.4 Child language: MCDI Time 3. 
At Time 3, mothers filled out the CDI Developmental Inventory Level III 
(Dale, 2001). In addition, mothers also filled out the same supplementary 
checklist of mental state verbs given at Time 2 (see Appendix C for a complete 
list). 
4.3.5 Child language: Reynell Developmental Language 
Scales (RDLS), Times 2 and 3. 
At Times 2 and 3 children were administered the Reynell Developmental 
Language Scales as a further test of their language. These scales consisted of an 
expressive and a receptive subscale. The children were administered the RDLS 
according to the published testing protocol. In order to reduce testing length 
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and to retain the children's attention at Time 3, they were not administered the 
single word comprehension section of the test (first 10 items). 
4.3.6 Child emotion - situation task: Time 2. 
Children were tested at the second time point on their ability to discern 
how a person felt. In the training phase children were seated on their mother's 
lap approximately 30 cm away from a 36 cm computer screen. The children 
were first presented with five sets of training pictures in order to familiarize 
them with the procedure for pointing (e.g., "Point to the teddy, is it this one or 
this one?"). The child's attention was first drawn to the picture by the 
experimenter (e.g., "Oh look, there's a teddy"). The experimenter then 
activated the next screen, depicting the original picture at the top of the screen 
and directly below, two other pictures (e.g., a teddy and a distracter item), 
vertically positioned. The child was then asked to point to one of the lower 
pictures that matched the original picture. The experimenter directed the child 
by saying "point to the teddy, is it this one or this one", and then pointing to 
both choices. 
In the test phase, children were then presented with a series of eight 
cartoon-style vignettes designed to elicit a specific emotional reaction from the 
protagonist (e.g., a boy being chased by a lion). The protagonist's face was 
blanked out and the only clues to how the protagonist was feeling were from 
situational clues. The experimenter said to the child: "Oh, look, we can't see 
his face. I wonder how he feels?" The children were then presented with 
another screen, showing the original picture of the person-situation at the top of 
the screen and two other pictures of a person's head expressing a choice of two 
emotions positioned vertically below the original picture (see Appendix D for a 
list of situations and emotion choices). The experimenter then asked the child 
twice: "Can you find his face, does he feel like this or like this?" The positioning 
of the correct face was randomly assigned to the top or bottom position and the 
position to which the experimenter initially pointed was counterbalanced 
between the top and bottom pictures. 
r 
CHAPTER 4: METHODS 57 
4.3.7 Child body- emotion task: Time 2. 
Children were also tested on their ability to discern how a person was 
feeling from their body position. The children were presented with eight 
pictures on a 36 cm computer screen of a person (four male and four female) 
experiencing either happiness or sadness (four of each). The person's face was 
not visible and the only clues were through body position (e.g., head in hands) 
(see Appendix E for a complete list of pictures). The experimenter instructed 
children to "Look at that lady /man/ girl. We can't see her face. I wonder how 
she feels". The child was then required to point to the face that best depicted 
how the person was feeling. The happy and sad faces were selected from the 
MacBrain Face Stimulus Set1 . Validity ratings of the faces in a previous study 
ranged from 80% to 97% agreement (Tottenham, Barscheid, Ellertsen, Marcus, 
& Nelson, April, 2002). The administration of the task was identical to the 
emotion-situation task. 
4.3.8 Child emotion - situation task and body emotion 
task: Time 3. 
Children were also tested at Time 3 on their ability to discern how a 
person felt. Both tasks were reduced versions of the emotion situation and 
body emotion tasks at Time 2 (see Appendices D & E). These shorter tasks 
were created in order to assist concentration on the tasks at Time 3 because the 
children were also administered a lengthy language assessment. The task was 
administered the same way as at Time 2, except that rather than being 
presented on a computer screen, the children were seated at a small table and 
presented with pictures (20 cm by 15 cm). 
1 Development of the MacBrain face stimulus set was overseen by Nim Tottenham and 
supported by the John D & Catherine T MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Early 
Experience and Brain Development. Please contact Nim Tottenham at tott0006@tc.umn.edu for 
more information concerning the stimulus set 
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4.3.9 Mother emotion recognition task I: Time 1. 
At Time 1, the mothers were administered two emotion recognition 
tasks, presented on a 38 cm computer screen. The first task, taken from 
Sullivan and Ruffman (2004), tested their ability to match a verbal emotional 
expression with a corresponding picture. Verbal emotional expressions 
consisted of grunts and groans or a sentence emoting one of the six basic 
emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, disgust, anger, surprise). Mothers were 
presented with 24 trials, each of which presented the same male figure (JJ) 
expressing happiness, sadness, fear, disgust, anger and surprise (Ekman & 
Freisen, 1976). Of the 24 trials, six depicted 100% pure emotional expressions, 
and 18 were emotion "morphs" (i.e., mixtures of two expressions with one 
emotion predominating). On each trial the six facial expressions were paired 
with an auditory expression of emotion ( one of the six expressions above) and 
the task required mothers to point to the facial expression that matched the 
auditory expression. 
4.3.10 Mother emotion recognition task II: Time 1. 
The second task examined mothers' ability to match a picture of an 
emotional expression with a corresponding emotion word. Mothers were 
administered 24 trials in which they were presented with a choice of four 
pictures depicting the same male (JJ) and an emotion word presented in the 
center of the screen. Mothers examined the pictures for four seconds after 
· which time the screen went blank for three seconds while they wrote down 
their answer. Similar to the first task, the pictures in 18 out of the 24 trials were 
morphed with another emotion . 
4.4 Scoring 
4.4.1 Child language: MCDI, Times 1, 2 and 3. 
The MCDI questionnaires were scored for several measures: 
Mental state language: At all three time points separate raw scores were 
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desire, emotion and think/know) terms that the mothers reported their child to 
know. 
Non-mental state language: In addition, a separate raw score was also 
calculated for the number of non-mental state terms. 
Syntax: At Times 2 and 3 separate raw syntax scores were also 
calculated . 
Pronouns: At Times 1 and 2 a dichotomous scoring system was used to 
calculate the percentage of children who were reported to use or understand 
pronouns. At Time 1, children who were reported to use or understand 1st, 
2nd or 3rd person pronouns were awarded a score of 1 (those who had no 
personal pronouns were given a 0). I chose not to separate out production from 
comprehension because there were such small numbers of both. Similarly, at 
Time 2, children were awarded a 1 or O depending on whether they were 
reported to produce any pronouns. Only their production was assessed 
because the MCDI: Words and sentences only requested mothers to report the 
words children produced. As the MCDI at Time 3 did not require mothers to 
report on pronoun use, therefore I was not able to assess this. 
4.4.2 Child language: Reynell Developmental Language 
Scales, Times 2 and 3. 
Raw scores were calculated for the number correct in the comprehension 
and production sections as well as a composite score. 
4.4.3 Mother mental and non-mental State Language 
(Picture task). 
The picture task was used to measure mother (but not child) mental 
state utterances. In order to control for mother verbosity, I examined each 
category of mental state terms as a percentage of total utterances (Meins et al., 
2003). I coded each type of mental state term separately because I was 
interested in the differences over time. The general criteria for coding were 
taken from Bartsch and Wellman (1995) as well as Ruff man et al. (2002) ( see 
Table 4.2 for examples and reliability ratings). Any exactly repeated mental 
j 
CHAPTER 4: METHODS 60 
state utterances and "I don't know" utterances were not counted as mother 
mental state utterances. 
Bartsch and Wellman (1995) reported that parents' genuine use of 'think' 
and 'know' terms far exceeded conversational and uncodeable references (see 
also Booth et al., 1997). For this reason, and because mothers' use of all types of 
mental terms could potentially teach children, the main interest was in mother 
use of all mental terms, not just "genuine" terms (see also Jenkins, Turrell, 
Kogushi, Lollis, & Ross, 2003 and Cutting & Dunn, 1999 who argue for a more 
inclusive coding criteria). However, as a comparison, I did examine genuine 
references to thinking and knowledge in some analyses. In these analyses I 
excluded conversational references to 'know' and 'think' such as "Know what? 
She's crying", "She might be tired, do you think?" (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; 
Shatz et al., 1983). 
4.4.4 Mother mental state talk 
Emotion 
Mental state terms included all references to emotion such as "happy", 
"pleased", "sad", "not happy", including all affective references which were 
not purely sad but could be interpreted as dissatisfaction or anger such as, 
"unhappy", "not happy", "not very happy" and "not pleased', "cross", 
"grumpy", "scared", "afraid", "disappointed", "worried", "upset", 
"surprised", "enjoy", "excited", "fun", "interested", "frustrated", "missed", 
"annoyed", "hurtful", "bored", "fed up". 
Desire 
A second category of mental state terms was general references to desire, 
including "want", "like", "love", "don't like", "hope", "prefer", and "keen on". 
Think and Know 
A third category of mental state terms was cognitive terms, including 
"think" and "know" but not "don't know" as an isolated utterance (e.g., I don't 
know). 
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A fourth category was 'modulations of assertion', terms that modulated 
the certainty of a proposition, including "might", "must", "maybe", "perhaps", 
"possibly", "probably", "could be", "certainly", "definitely", "sure", "guess", 
"figure", "reckon", "certain", "suppose", "guess", "figure", "suppose", 
"wonder", "expect", "curious", and "bet". 
Other 
The final mental state category, 'other', included terms which referred to 
some kind of mental activity but were not included in one of the above 
categories: "remember", "understand'", "forget", "remind", "realize", "idea", 
"consider", "have in mind", "daydream", "dream" (when asleep), "mean", 
"imagine", "wonder", and "expect". 
4.4.5 Mother non-mental state talk 
Descriptions 
I also coded for non-mental state utterances (see Ruffman et al., 2002 and 
Table 2 for examples). The first category" descriptions", referred to utterances 
that were simple descriptions of the pictures (e.g., The girl is playing). 
Body Parts 
'Body parts' referred to either a depicted character's facial or body 
features or to the child's facial or body features. 
Links 
'Links' were utterances which linked something the mother talked about 
in the pictures to things in the child's own life ( e.g., "Do we tell Daddy he's 
naughty if he's angry?"; "But we have a goat don't we?"). 
Physical State 
Other categories included 'physical state', which referred to any 
physiological sensations either the characters or the children were experiencing 
including, "tired", "hungry", "thirsty", "smiling", "laughing", "giggling", 
"hurt", "in pain". 
Animals 
Because the pictures frequently depicted animals, I also separately coded 
mothers' references to animals and animal sounds. 
,\ 
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Orienting 
In addition, mothers made frequent attempts to engage their children's 
attention and I referred to such attempts as orienting utterances. There were 
two types of orienting utterances: linguistic ("Look, there's a girl"; "What's 
that?") and non-linguistic attempts such as a sharp inhalation of breath ( e.g., 
"Oh") designed to draw the child's attention to a picture. 
4.4.6 Inter-reliability coding 
One person coded all transcripts and 25 % percent of the transcripts were 
coded by another coder as a reliability check (see Table 4.2 for reliability ratings 
for each mental and non-mental state category). Discrepancies were resolved 
through discussion between both coders. 
Table 4.2. Inter-rater Reliabilities for Mother Utterances in the Picture Task 
Category 





Modulations of assertion 
Other mental state 








Grumpy, surprised, frightened, sad, 
pleased, happy 
Love, want, like, hope, wish, dream, 
prefer, keen on 
Yes, I think he is in the meadow, isn't he?; 
What color are the flowers, do you know? 
I think it's a girl 
Might, maybe, perhaps, possibly, 
probably, could be 
Remember that last time we cut onions 
and they made your eyes water too, didn't 
they 
The boys are playing with their swords 
Face, eyes, nose, hair, mouth, ears, hands, 
feet, leg, body 
"You like your medicine"; "Does that look 
like Spot?" 
Hungry, sick, crying, tickled, laughing, 
smiling, giggle, thirsty, ill, hurt, sore, 
sleepy 
Mother repeats own utterance exactly 
without any intervening codeable 
utterance 
Cat, lamb, sheep, dog, cow 
Child emotion tasks: Times 2 and 3. 
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Maternal education level (Maternal SES). 
As a measure of SES, mothers' education was coded on a 6-point scale: 0 
= no high school qualification (left school at 15), 1 = high school qualification, 2 
= some university or polytechnic papers, 3 = polytechnic diploma, 4 = 
undergraduate degree, 5 = postgraduate degree. 
'e' 
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Chapter 5 Results I: Maternal 
Mental State Language and Child 
Social Understanding Between the 
Ages of 15, 24 and 33 Months 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present the results pertaining to the first two 
goals of this study: (1) To examine how the proportion of specific mental state 
terms (such as desires, emotions and thinking/knowing) mothers used differed 
at each time point and changed between 15, 24 and 33 months and (2) to 
examine the relation between mother mental and non-mental state language at 
15 and 24 months and two indices of child social understanding at 24 and 33 
months (mental state language and emotion task performance), partialling out 
several potentially confounding variables including all earlier child language, 
mother socio-economic status (SES) and mother's own emotion understanding. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics for mother mental and non-
mental state language and child mental state language at Times 1, 2 and 3. Any 
scores outside three standard deviations from the mean were identified as 
outliers. These outlier scores were re-assigned as the maximum score plus one 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). The mean number of mother utterances at Time 1 
was 131.88 (SD= 51.81), Time 2 was 154.95 (SD = 54.17) and Time 3 was 159.20 
(SD = 60.76). At all time points the mental and non-mental state utterances 
included in the analysis accounted for approximately 50% of the range of 
' / 
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utterances mothers used. The remaining 50% consisted of orienting type 
utterances (e.g., "What's that?" and "What can you see?"). In line with 
Bretherton et al. (1986) and Ruffman et al. (2002) orienting utterances were not 
included in any further analysis as they were shown by Ruffman et al. (2002) to 
bear no relation to child mental state language. In the present study there were 
no correlations between orienting utterances and later child mental state talk 
after the child's language had been accounted for. Additionally, as no 
differences were found in mother input directed at boys versus girls all 
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Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics of key measures 
Time 1 (N = 74) Time 2 (N=74) Time 3 (N=72) 
M (SD) Range M (SD) Range M (SD) Range 
Mother mental state utterances 
Emotion 5.26 (3.84) 0-18.75 4.91 (3.25) 0- 15.00 5.31 (3.25) 0- 7.14 
Desire 3.18 (2.28) 0-11.76 2.33 (1.98) 0- 7.00 2.87 (1.95) 0 - 11.00 
Think and know 1.50 (2.04) 0- 8.33 3.21 (2.99) 0- 11.00 8.16 (4.90) _ 0-19.65 
Modulations of assertion 0.30 (.94) 0- 6.03 0.93 (1.46) 0- 10.00 2.72 (3.05) 0-14.18 
Other mental state 0.56 (1.01) 0- 4.74 0.10 ( .28) 0- 1.00 0.32 ( .61) 0 - 3.60 
Mother non-mental state utterances 
Descriptions 20.80 (8.06) 1.30- 36.00 21.87 (6.89) 8.33- 37.22 24.03 (6.69) 6.20-41.57 
Links 1.53 (1.50) 0- 7.22 2.89 (2.84) 0- 12.50 3.02 (3.04) 0-16.59 
Body parts 6.17 (5.46) 0-21.00 3.91 (3.35) 0- 17.00 3.94 (2.91) 0-11.80 
Physical state 4.16 (3.27) 0-14.94 3.93 (2.47) 0 - 10.53 4.51 (2.92) 0-13.48 
Mother exact self-repetitions 1.87 (1.83) 0- 7.00 0.92 (1.16) 0 - 4.40 0.33 ( .55) 0- 3.09 
Animals 11.75 (5.15) 0- 27.08 8.50 (5.24) 1.00- 33.00 3.33 (2.31) 0 -11.11 
Child social understanding 
MCDI emotion terms 1.36 (2.24) 0- 7.00 2.39 ( 3.36) 0- 13.00 9.49 (5.98) 0-28 
MCDI desire terms 0.80 (1.19) - 0- 5.00 1.04 ( 1.48) 0- 6.00 4.68 (1.96) 0-10 
MCDI belief terms 0 0 0.08 ( 0.39) 0- 2.00 1.49 (1.34) 0 - 7.00 
MCDI total mental state 2.35 (3.64) 0-14.00 3.51 ( 4.69) 0- 16.00 21.36 (12.98) 2-61 
RDLS 
Emotion situation task (T2: N=54), (T3: N=69) 
Body emotion task (T2: N=44), (T3: N=69) 
Other mother measures 
Maternal SES 
Emotion picture - emotional expression task 
Emotion picture - written word task 
2.66 (1.50) 0 - 5.00 
15.97 (3.99) 5.00 - 24.00 
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8 - 50 38.36 (11.46) 
25.00 - 88.00 56.76* (22.56) 




Note. * p <.05, ** p <.01. All mother mental state variables are calculated as percentages of overall utterances. MCDI refers to the MacArthur 
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5.3 Changes across time in the percentage of mother 
and child mental state language 
First I was interested in the extent to which the percentage of mothers' 
mental state language changed over time (see Figure 5-1). Because different 
pictures could elicit different types of mental state language, I was not 
interested in whether mothers used more of one type of language ( e.g., 
emotion) relative to another ( e.g., think/know). Instead, I was interested in 
whether a particular type of mother language increased or decreased over time 
given identical pictures at the three time points. To explore these data, I 
conducted a 3 (Time: Time 1, Time 2, Time 3) x 5 (Mental state: emotion, 
desire, belief, modulations of assertion, other mental states) analysis of 
variance. The results yielded main effects for time, F(2, 68) = 20.66, p < .001, 
and mental state term, F(4, 66) = 90.83, p < .001, and a significant interaction, 
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I first examined the changes between Times 1 and 2. I conducted five one-way 
analyses of variance after applying Holm's correction to ensure the family-wise 
error rate was less than .05. Mothers' desire language at Time 2 decreased 
significantly, F(l,73) = 6.25, p < .05, 772 = .08, as did other mental state language, 
F(l,73) = 13.47, p < .001, 772 = .16, whereas references to think and know 
increased over time, F(l,73) = 27.11, p < .001, ry2 = .27. There were no differences 
over time in emotion language or modulations of assertion. 
5.3.1 Changes in mother mental state language between 
Times 2 and3 
To explore the changes between Times 2 and 3, I conducted five one-way 
analyses of variance, applying Holm's correction to ensure the family-wise 
error was less than .05. Mother use of think/know, F(l, 70) = 107.29, p < .001, ry2 
= .60, modulations of assertion, F(l, 70) = 28.36, p < .001, ry2 = .29, increased 
between Times 2 and 3. There were no changes in the use of mother emotion 
language, F(l, 70) = .76, n.s., or mother desire language, F(l, 70) = 2.25, n.s. 
Mother talk about other mental states increased between Times 2 and 3, F(l, 70) 
=-9.01, p < .001, 772 = .11, although given the very small proportional use of 
other mental state terms these trends should be interpreted with some caution. 
5.3.2 Changes in mother mental state language between 
Times 1 and3 
To obtain a picture of overall changes in mothers' language between 
Times 1 and 3, I conducted five more one-way analyses of variance (again 
applying Holms correction). Between Times 1 and 3, there were significant 
increases in mother think/know language, F(l,69) = 126.30, p < .001, ry 2 = .65 
and modulations of assertions, F(l, 69) = 43.47, p < .001, ry2.= .39. There was no 
change in mother use of emotion language, F(l,69) = .45, n.s., desire language, 
F(l,69) = .96, n.s., or other mental state language, F(l,69) = 3.52, n.s. In short, 
whereas mother desire talk decreased slightly (though not significantly from 
Times 1 to 3), think/know talk increased more than four times, and 
modulations of assertion increased nine times. 
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As a check, I also conducted analyses of changes in mother mental state 
talk at all time points using raw numbers (rather than percentages). All the 
trends were replicated with raw data except for a decrease in mother desire talk 
between Time 1 and Time 2, which was approaching significance. 
5.3.3 Changes in child mental state language between 
Times 1, 2 and 3 
I then considered how children's mental state language changed over 
time. To recall, at Time 1, in keeping with the MacArthur Communicative 
Development Inventory protocol, mothers reported on both their child's 
receptive and productive mental state talk, whereas at Times 2 and 3 they 
reported only their child's productive mental state talk. To ensure consistency 
across time points, I examined the change in children's productive mental state 
language over all three time points (see Figure 5-2). Figure 5-2 illustrates the 

























Figure 5-2. Number of different emotion, desire and think/know terms used by children as 
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I first examined the change in children's use of mental state terms, 
conducting a 3 (Time: Time 1, Time 2, Time 3) x 3 (Mental state term: emotion, 
desire, belief) repeated measures analysis of variance. The results yielded main 
effects of time, F(2, 69) = 204.85, p < .001, 172 = .75, and mental state term, F(2, 
69) = 115.13, p < .001, 172 = .62 and an interaction between time and mental state, 
F(2, 69) = 93.86, p < .001, 172 = .57. To explore this interaction I conducted two 
sets of three one-way analyses of variance (Time 1 - Time 2 and Time 2 - Time 
3). There was a significant increase in children's reported emotion terms, 
F(l,73) = 37.52, p < .001, 172 = .34, and their use of desire terms, F(l, 73) = 36.35, 
p < .001, 172 = .33, between Times 1 and 2. In contrast there was no significant 
difference in their use of think/know language between Times 2 and 3, F(l, 73) 
= 3.09, p < .001, 172 = .04. There was a significant increase in the number of 
~ --emotionjerms,_E(l,70)_ = 138.01,~fL < .001,_ll~~= .66, desire terms, F~ZQt= 2Z5.07, .. 
p < .001, 172 = .80, and think/know terms, F(l, 70) = 79.89, p < .001, 172 = .53, 
between Times 2 and 3. 
In order to compare the development of mental state terms over time, 
Figure 5-3 depicts the percentage of children at each time point who were 
reported to use at least some of each type of mental state term (i.e., used some 
desire terms versus used no desire terms). At Time 1, no children were 
reported to use these terms in their productive language. At Time 2, around 
half the children were reported to use at least one type of desire and emotion 
term, with this rising to almost 100% at Time 3. In contrast, only 4% of children 
were reported to use any think/know terms at Time 2. The picture changes 
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Figure 5-3. Changes in the percentage of children who were reported by mothers to use at least 
some desire, emotion or think/know terms over all time points 
Using McNemar's Test, I examined the changes in children's use of 
desire, emotion and think/know mental state terms across the time points. The 
percentage of children using desire terms between Time 1 and Time 2 
significantly increased, x2 (1, N = 74) = 31.03, p < .001, as did the percentage of 
children using emotion terms, x2 (1, N = 74) = 37.03, p < .001 . There was no 
significant change in the percentage of children using think/know terms 
between Times 1 and 2. The percentage of children using desire terms 
significantly increased between Times 2 and 3, x2 (1, N = 71) = 35.02, p < .001, as 
did the percentage of children using emotion terms, x2 (1, N = 71) = 30.03, p < 
.001, and think/know terms, x2 (1, N = 71) = 46.02, p < .001. Between Times 1 
and 3, the percentage of children using desire terms, x2 (1, N = 71) = 68.01, p < 
.001, emotion terms, x2 (1, N = 71) = 68.01, p < .001, and think/know terms, ,(1, 
N = 71) = 49.02, p < .001 all significantly increased. 
5.3.4 Summary 
The data suggest an interrelated pattern of change between mothers' use 
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state terms. Mothers initially use a lot of desire and emotion terms, which 
remains relatively stable across the three time points but very little use of 
think/know terms. Similarly, children go from using no mental state terms at 
Time 1 to using some desire and emotion terms at Time 2, but still relatively 
few think/know terms at Time 2. Mothers significantly increased their use of 
think/know terms between Times 2 and 3, which corresponds with children's 
dramatic increase in their use of think/know terms at Time 3. Thus, the 
children's lower use of think/know terms at time 2 parallels the mothers' lower 
use of think/know terms at earlier time points. 
5.4 Child performance on emotion tasks 
At Time 2 only 54 children completed the emotion situation task and 44 
completed the body emotion task At Time 3, 69 children completed each task 
At Time 2, children performed better than chance in the emotion situation task, 
t(53) = 3.61, p < .001, as well as the body emotion task, t(43) = 2.48, p < .05. 
Likewise, at Time 3, children performed better than chance in both the emotion 
situation task, t(68) = 2.49, p <.05, and the body emotion task, t(68) = 3.82, p 
<.001. At Time 2 due to fatigue, some children did not complete all 8 trials and 
therefore their score was taken as a percentage of their completed trials. 
Chance was calculated as 50% correct. Children who completed at least 5 trials 
were included in the analyses. At Time 3 all children who completed the tasks 
were able to sustain their attention for the duration of the emotion situation and 
body emotion tasks. 
5.5 Correlations between mother mental state 
language and child mental state language within time 
points 
Table 5.2, Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 list the within time point correlations. 
At Time 1, there were no significant correlations between mother mental state 
language and child mental state language (see Table 5.2), whereas at Time 2, 
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mother desire language and think/know talk were significant correlates of 
some types of child language (see Table 5.3). At Time 3, mothers' think/know 
talk was a consistent correlate of child language at this time point. 
., 
', 
{ Table 5.2. Zero-order correlations between Time 1 mother mental state talk and Time 1 child language 
Time1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
'f 1. Child MCDI emotion 
,,, 
2. Child MCDI desire .60** 




4. Mother desire .19 .11 .18 
5. Mother emotion .12 .04 .09 .00 
>-
6. Mother think/know .04 .06 .04 .04 .24* 
7. Mother modulations of 
·_y .10 .06 .05 .03 .16 .62** 
assertion 
8. Mother other mental state .02 .06 .06 .11 .00 .13 .13 
:r 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01 (all significance tests are one-tailed). MCDI refers to the McArthur 
Communicative Development Inventory. 
\.. , 
Table 5.3. Zero-order correlations between Time 2 mother mental state talk and Time 2 child language 
r 
Time2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Child MCDI emotion 
'1 
2. Child MCDI desire .68** 
~ 3. Child MCDI mental state 
.96** .85** 
total 
;:'>-,,, 4. Mother desire .20* .07 .16 
'~\ 
5. Mother emotion .13 .05 .07 .35** 
;r 6. Mother think/know .17 .28* .21 .46** .30* 
7. Mother modulations of 
.17 .30** .23* .12 .10 .44** 
assertion 
8. Mother other mental state .03 . 17 .09 .18 . .08 .20 .07 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01 (all significance tests are one-tailed). MCDI refers to the McArthur 
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Table 5.4. Zero-order correlations between Time 3 mother mental state talk and Time 3 child mental 
state language 
Time3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Child MCDI emotion 
2. Child MCDI desire .76** 
3. Child MCDI belief .51** .56** 
4. Child MCDI total mental .95** .85** .68** 
state 
5. Mother desire .17 .05 .06 .12 
6. Mother emotion .05 .14 .11 .03 .13 
7. Mother think/know .36** .26* .35** .38** .31** .26* 
8. Mother other mental state .03 -.02 .02 .01 .27* -.08 .13 
9. Mother modulations of .14 .14 .16 .19 .36** .14 .55** .31** 
assertion 
Note. p <.05, ** p <.01 (all significance tests are one tailed). MCDI refers to the MacArthur 
Communicative Development Inventory . 
5.6 Relation between child language ability and child 
mental state language and per£ ormance on emotion tasks 
between Times 1, 2 and 3 
As children's language ability has been closely related to their 
performance on theory of mind tasks, I was next interested in the relation 
between their general language ability ( as indexed by the MCDI and RDLS) 
and mental state language and performance on the emotion tasks. 
Table 5.5 depicts the zero-order correlations between children's general 
language (as indexed by the MCDI) at Time 1 and their later mental state 
language and emotion task performance at Time 2. 
Similarly Table 5.6 depicts the zero-order correlations between the 
children's general language at Time 1 and their Time 3 mental state language 
and performance on the emotion tasks. All language measures at 15 months 
correlated with children's later total mental state language at times 2 and 3 but 
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Table 5] depicts the correlations between children's performance on the 
RDLS and MCDI language at Time 2, and their performance on the emotion 
tasks and reported mental state language at Time 3. Assessed general language 
ability (RDLS) at Time 2. was ~ghly correlated with all reported mental state 
language (both reported and observed) as well as one out of the two emotion 
tasks at Time 3. 
I 
Reported general langt;tage (MCDI) correlated with all 
reported mental state language at Time 3. 
These findings suggest that any analyses that examine the relation 
between children's social understanding and mother input, should take into 
account any variance attributable to children's general language abilities. By 
:partialling out early child language, one can be more confident that any 
observed relation between early mothers' language and later children's mental 
state language is not due to the mediating influence of correlations between 
children's general language and mothers' mental state language, as well as 
children's early general language and later mental state language. 
Table 5.5. Relation between child general and mental state language at Time 1 and their mental state 
language and task performance at Time 2 
Time 1 measures 
MCDI productive MCDI receptive MCDI total 
Time 2 measures 
MCDI emotion . 32** .34** .40** . 
MCDI desire .51** .20 .31** 
MCDibelief .31** .15 .21 
MCDI total mental state .42** .32** .t:j:1** 
Emotion situation -.24 -.25 -.30* 
Body emotion- -.21 -.01 -.06 
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Table 5.6. Relation between child general and mental state language at Time 1 and their mental state 
language and task performance at Time 3 









MCDI total mental state .32** 
Emotion situation -.14 
Body emotion -.01 
· Time 1 measures 







Note. p <.05; ** p <.01. MCDI refers to the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory. 
Table 5.7. Relation between children's language ability at Time 2 and performance on emotion tasks at 
Time3 
· Time 2 measures 
Time 3 measures RDLStotal MCDiwords MCDisyntax 
MCDI emotion - .35** .57** .51** 
MCDidesire .41** .65** .61** 
MCDibelief .28* .46** .37** 
MCDI total mental state .37** .60** .55** 
Emotion situation .07 -.02 .13 
Body emotion .27* .08 .16 
Note. p <.05; ** p <.01. MCDI refers to the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory. 
5.7 Relation between mother mental and non-mental 
state talk at Time 1 and child mental state language and 
emotion task per£ ormance at Time 2 
, To address my second goal, I examined whether mother talk about 
mental states to children could predict children's later use of these terms as 
well as their understanding of emotions. I was interested in the predictive 
power of mother language in general and therefore I was interested in the 
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social understanding. In this section, I examined whether mother use of mental 
and non-mental state language at Time 1 related to a child's later acquisition of 
these terms and success on the emotion tasks at Time 2. Table 5.8 contains the 
partial correlations for Time 1 mother mental and non-mental state language 
with Time 2: (a) child mental state language as reported on the MCDI, and (b) 
child performance on both emotion tasks. The correlations with children's 
Time 2 emotion, desire, and total mental state language and the emotion tasks, 
are shown having partialled out all Time 1 child productive and receptive 
language on the MCDI, mother SES, and mother performance on the emotion 
tasks. 
Time 1 mother desire terms correlated with all three categories of child 
mental state language at Time 2 as well as the emotion-situation task. No other 
type of mother mental state language correlated with later child language or 
emotion task performance. Of the types of mother non-mental state language, 
references to body parts correlated with later child desire language, and 
mothers' references to animals correlated with later child emotion talk and total 
mental state talk Mother references to animals also correlated with children's 
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Table 5.8. Partial correlations between mothers' mental and non-mental state utterances at Time 1 and 
child mental state language (MCDI) and emotion task performance at Time 2 
Category Time 2 child MCDI language Time 2 child emotion task 
performance 
Emotion a Desirea Total Animalsa Emotion 
mental situation• 
statea n=54 
Mother Time 1 mental state talk 
Desire .40* .34* .42* .07 .30* 
Emotion -.11 -.23 -.16 -.05 -.05 
Think/know .06 -.01 .03 -.00 .03 
Modulations of assertion .11 .01 .00 -.01 -.09 
Other mental state -.10 .02 -.07 .21* -.05 
Mother Time 1 non-mental state 
talk 
Descriptions .07 .00 .04 -.02 .07 
Links -.07 -.01 -.05 -.04 .03 
Body parts .17 .28* .24* .18 .11 
Physical state .03 -.00 .02 -.08 .19 
Animals .25* .17 .25* .22* .05 
Mother self-repetitions -.32* -.24* -.34* -.18 .14 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01 (all significance tests are one-tailed). aPartialling out SES, mother 
performance on emotion recognition tasks and child's MCDI receptive and productive 
language including all mental state language at Time 1. 
Table 5.9. Partial correlations between earlier mother mental and non-mental state language and later 
child mental state language 
Early mother desire talk and later child MCDI total mental state language• 
Early mother talk about body parts and later child MCDI total mental state 
languageb 
Early mother talk about animals and later child MCDI total mental state 
languageb 
Early mother animal talk and later child MCDI animal talkc 
Early mother mental state other talk and later child MCDI animal taJkd 
Early child mental state language and later mother desire languagee 
























Note. *p < .05 **p < .01 (all significii!lce tests are one-tailed). aPartialling out earlier 
child MCDI total language, mother talk about body parts; SES, mother performance on emotion 
tasks; bPartialling out earlier child MCDI total language and mother talk about desire; SES, 
mother performance on emotion tasks; cPartialling out earlier child MCDI total language; SES, 
and mother other mental state talk, a shared correlate; dPartialling out earlier child MCDI total 
language; SES, and mother animal talk, a shared correlate; ePartialling out earlier mother desire 
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Using similar analyses as above, and based on the significant 
correlations in Table 5.8, I also examined whether mother mental state language 
was a unique correlate of child non-mental state language (see Table 5.9). Only 
mother animal talk (and not mental state talk) correlated with later child animal 
language. In sum, mother desire talk was a unique correlate of later child 
mental state talk (and emotion task performance), and mother non-mental state 
talk was a unique correlate of later child non-mental state talk. 
Based on the significant correlations in Table 5.8,. I next used linear 
regression to examine which of the significant mother mental state language 
variables accounted for the most variance in later child mental state language 
and emotion-situation task performance (see Table 5.10). I entered in the first 
step all potentially confounding variables ( e.g., SES, mother emotion task 
performance, total Time 1 child language, other significant correlates from 
Table 5.8), with the targeted predictor variable entered in the second step. Only 
mother desire talk at Time 1 remained a significant correlate and predictor of 
both later child total mental state language and emotion situation task 
performance. 
Table 5.10. Summan; of hierarchical regression statistics predicting child mental and non-mental state 
language at Time 2, child performance on the emotion situation task, and mother use of desire language 
at Time 2 
Variable t R2andf'lR2 
Dependent variable = Child total mental state talk at Time 2 
Step 1: Time 1 child MCDI language, mother body parts talk, 




Time 1 mother animal talk 
Time 1 mother body parts talk 
Mother emotion/ sound task 
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Variable p t R2 andM2 
Time 1 child MCDI productive language .39 3.90c 
Time 1 child MCDI receptive language .22 2.19b 
Time 1 mother desire talk .30 2.82b .08 
Dependent variable = Child total mental state talk at Time 2 
Step 1: Time 1 child MCDI language, mother desire talk, 
mother animal talk, mother performance on emotion tasks, 
and SES .40 
Step 2: 
SES .04 .34 
Time 1 mother animal talk .11 1.01 
Time 1 mother desire talk .30 2.79b 
Mother emotion/ sound task .13 1.23 
Mother emotion/ word task -.17 -1.55 
Time 1 child MCDI productive language .38 3.86b 
Time 1 child MCDI receptive language .22 2.19a 
Time 1 mother body parts talk .12 1.08 .01 
Dependent variable = Child total mental state talk at Time 2 
Step 1: Time 1 child MCDI language, mother desire talk, 
mother body parts talk, mother performance on emotion 
tasks, and SES .41 
Step 2: 
SES .04 .34 
Time 1 mother body parts talk .12 1.08 
Mother emotion/ sound task -.17 -.16 
Mother emotion/word task .13 1.23 
Time 1 child MCDI productive language .38 3.86c 
Time 1 child MCDI receptive language .22 2.19a 
Time 1 mother desire talk .30 2.79b 
Mother animal talk .11 1.01 .01 
Dependent variable = Child total mental state talk at Time 2 
Step 1: Mother animal talk, mother desire talk, mother body 
parts talk, mother performance on emotion tasks, and SES .19 
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Variable p t R2 andM2 
Step 2: 
SES .01 .08 
Time 1 mother animal talk .09 .78 
Time 1 mother desire talk .29 2.58a 
Mother emotion/ sound task -.15 -1.23 
Mother emotion/ word task .15 1.39 
Time 1 mother body parts talk .13 1.14 
Time 1 child MCDI language .37 3.56C .14 
Dependent variable = Child total mental state talk at Time 2 
Step 1: Time 1 child MCDI language, mother animal talk, 
mother desire talk, mother body parts talk, and SES .38 
Step 2: 
SES -.03 -.32 
Time 1 mother body parts talk .09 .79 
Time 1 child MCDI productive language .39 3.84C 
Time 1 child MCDI receptive language .23 2.20a 
Time 1 mother desire talk .29 2.67a 
Mother performance on emotion tasks .04 -.42 .00 
Dependent variable = Child total mental state talk at Time 2 
Step 1: Time 1 child MCDI language, mother animal talk, 
mother desire talk, mother body parts talk, and mother 
performance on emotion tasks .41 
Step 2: 
Time 1 mother body parts talk .12 1.08 
Mother emotion/ sound task -.17 -1.55 
Mother emotion/ word task .13 1.23 
Time 1 child MCDI productive language .38 3.86c 
Time 1 child MCDI receptive language .22 2.19a 
Time 1 mother desire talk .30 2.79b 
Mother animal talk .11 1.01 
SES 04 .34 .00 
Dependent variable = Child animal language at Time 2 
Step 1: Time 1 child MCDI language, mother mental state 
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Variable ~ t R2 andM2 
other talk, and SES .25 
Step 2: 
Time 1 mother mental state other talk .15 1.40 
Time 1 child MCDI productive language .37 3.54b 
Time 1 child MCDI receptive language .18 1.67a 
SES .11 1.06 
Time 1 mother animal talk .18 1.73a .03 
'~ Dependent variable = Child animal language at Time 2 
Step 1: Time 1 mother animal talk, mother mental state other 
talk, and SES .09 
t-' Step 2: 
> 
Time 1 mother animal talk .16 1.45 
Time 1 mother mental state other talk .20 1.8oa 
SES .10 .94 
, Time 1 child MCDI language .33 2.97b .10 
;, 
Dependent variable = Child animal language at Time 2 





Time 1 child MCDI productive language .37 3.54C 
Time 1 child MCDI receptive language .18 1.68a 
Time 1 mother animal talk .18 1.73a 
\ 
-;, SES .11 1.06 
Time 1 mother mental state other talk .15 1.40 .02 
Dependent variable = Mother desire language at Time 2 




Time 1 mother desire talk .06 .52 
Time 1 child MCDI total mental state language .04 .38 .02 
',r 
.:, 
Dependent variable = Child performance on emotion - situation task at 
Time2 
Step 1: Time 1 child MCDI language, mother performance on 
I ., 
,. 
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Variable p t R2 andM2 
emotion tasks and SES 
Step 2: 
Mother emotion/ sound task .06 .39 
Mother emotion/word task .20 1.45 
Time 1 child MCDI productive language -.23 -1.70 
Time 1 child MCDI receptive language -.19 -1.41 
SES .05 .35 
Time 1 mother desire talk .28 2.08a 
Note. p = standardized regression coefficient. R2 = proportion of variance explained by variable. 
L'lR2 = change in proportion of variance explained by a variable (i.e., additional variance 
explained by a variable). MCDI refers to the MacArthur Communicative Development 
Inventory. ap < .05, bp < .01, cp < .001 (all significance tests are one-tailed). 
5.8 Is there a reciprocal relation between child talk 
about mental states and later mother talk about mental 
states? 
Due to the cross-lagged nature of the design, I was able to examine the 
inverse relation that is, whether Time 1 child mental state language influenced 
the extent to which mothers used mental state language at Time 2 (see Table 
5.9). In other words, does child talk about mental states influence the extent to 
which mothers talk about mental states at a later time point? At Time 1 the 
only mental state term that predicted child use of mental state language and 
emotion task performance was mother desire language. Therefore, I examined 
whether child total mental state language at Time 1 influenced the extent to 
which mothers used desire language at Time 2 (see Table 5.9). Having 
accounted for potentially confounding variables (mother desire language at 
Time 1, SES and mother performance on emotion tasks), there was no relation 
between child total mental state language and later mother desire language, pr 
= -.01, indicating a unidirectional relation between early mother desire 
language at 15 months and child mental state language at 24 months. Using 
hierachical regression, accounting for potentially confounding variables such as 
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account for any further variance in mother talk about desires at Time 2 (see 
Table 5.10). 
I also conducted a similar analysis in which I examined the extent to 
which child talk about mental states at Time 2 predicted mother talk about 
thoughts and knowledge at Time 3 (the most consistent predictor of later child 
mental state talk and emotion understanding) (see Table 5.13). After 
accounting for shared variance with mother think/know talk at Time 2 
(accounting for 35% of the variance), child talk about mental states was not a 
significant predictor of later mother talk about thoughts and knowledge. 
5.8.1 Summary 
Between 15 and 24 months, mothers' tendency to use desire language 
rather than any other type of mental state language was predictive of a child's 
later mental state talk and performance on the emotion situation task. When 
pitted against mother non-mental state talk, mother talk about mental states 
( desire talk) rather than a non-mental state talk variable accounted for unique 
variance in a child's later mental state talk and performance on the emotion 
situation task, over and above mothers' SES, mothers' performance on the 
emotion task, and the child's language levels (see Table 5.9 and Table 5.10). 
5.9 Relation between mother mental and non-mental 
state talk at Time 1 and child mental state language and 
emotion task performance at Time 3 
I now examine the partial correlations between mother language at 15 
months (Time 1) and child mental state language and task performance at 33 
months (Time 3). Table 5.11 contains the partial correlations for mother mental 
and non-mental state language at Time 1 with Time 3 (a) child mental state 
language (MCDI) and (b) child performance on the two emotion tasks. These 
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receptive language on the MCDt mother SES and mother performance on the 
emotion tasks. There was a relation between mothers' use of think/know 
language at Time 1 and children's performance on the emotion situation task. 
There was also a negative correlation between mothers' tendency to repeat her 
own utterances and children's later use of think/know language. 
Table 5.11. Partial correlations between mothers' mental and non-mental state utterances at Time 1 and 
child mental state language (MCDI) at Time 3 
Child MCDI language at Time 3a 
Emotion Desire Think/know Total 
mental 
state 
.09 .07 .14 .11 
-.08 .11 .00 .07 
Child task 
performance 





Think/know -.07 .10 -.02 .00 .23* .06 
Modulations of assertion -.01 .14 -.02 .05 .21 
Other mental state .07 .00 .10 .05 .16 
Descriptions .06 .06 .09 .06 .04 
Links .12 .13 -.05 .09 .11 
Body parts .15 .20 .06 .18 .14 
Physical state .04 .03 -.05 .00 .07 
Animals .07 .12 .17 .08 .15 
Mother self-repetition -.14 .09 -.21* .17 .14 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01 (all significance tests are one-tailed). aPartialling out SES, mother 
performance on emotion recognition tasks and child's MCDI receptive and productive 
language including all mental state language at Time 1. 
5.10 Relation between mother mental and non-mental 
state talk at Time 2 and child mental state language and 









Finally, I examined the relation between mothers' mental and non-mental 
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states and understanding of emotion at 33 months. Similar to above, the partial 
correlations in Table 5.12 are shown having partialled out all Time 2 child 
language (MCDI words and syntax and RDLS total score), mother SES and 
mother performance on the emotion tasks. Mother talk about desires and 
emotions at Time 2 correlated with two of the four child mental state language 
measures at Time 3, but neither emotion task (total= 2/6). On the other hand, 
mother talk about thoughts/knowledge at Time 2 correlated with three of four 
child language measures at Time 3 as well as one of two emotion tasks at Time 
3 (total = 4/ 6). In contrast, no mother non-mental state language at Time 2 
correlated with child mental state language or task performance at Time 3, with 
the exception of links which correlated with child desire talk at Time 3, and 
descriptions which correlated negatively with child desire talk at Time 3. 
Unlike between Times 1 and 2, I was unable to examine the relation between 
mother non-mental state talk (such as animals) and later child non-mental state 
talk (such as animals) because the CDI-III was a short form which did not allow 
for widespread categorization of terms. Furthermore, children at 33 months 
already have extensive animal vocabularies and consequently there would have 
been very little variance, potentially resulting in a misleading analysis . 
Table 5.12. Partial correlations between mothers' mental state utterances at Time 2 and child mental 
state language (MCDI) and emotion task performance at Time 3 
Child MCDI language at Time 3 Child task performance 





Modulation of assertion 
Other mental state 
Descriptions 
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Links .03 .29* .11 .11 .15 
Body parts -.13 .15 -.01 -.13 .01 
Physical state -.01 .06 .02 .00 .05 
Animals -.10 .17 .03 -.11 -.13 
Mother self-repetition -.04 .10 -.15 -.07 .08 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01 (all significance tests are one-tailed). lPartialling out SES, mother 
performance on emotion recognition tasks and child's MCDI receptive and productive 
language including all mental state language at Time 2. 2Partialling out SES, mother 
performance on emotion recognition tasks and all child's language including MCDI and RDLS 
scores at Time 2. 
Again, similar to the analysis conducted between Times 1 and 2, based 
on the significant correlations in Table 5.12, I used hierarchical linear regression 
to examine which of the significant mother mental state language variables 
( emotion, desire or belief) accounted for the most variance in later child mental 
state language (see Table 5.13). I entered in the first step all potentially 
confounding variables ( e.g., SES, mother emotion task performance, total Time 
2 child language, other significant correlates from Table 5.12), with the targeted 
predictor variable entered in the second step. The first dependent variable I 
examined was child total mental state talk at Time 3. Together, emotion, desire 
and think/know talk accounted for 10% of the variance over and above the 
variance attributed to child language at Time 2, SES and mother performance 
on the emotion tasks, although no individual mental state variable remained a 
significant correlate of later child total mental state language, after accounting 
for shared variance due to the other variables. 
As think/know talk at Time 2 was the only predictor of performance on 
the emotion situation task at Time 3, I was also interested in how much unique 
variance could be attributed to this variable. Mother talk about thinking and 
knowing accounted for 11 % of the variance, over and above child language at 






CHAPTER 5: RESULTS I 89 
Table 5.13. Summary of hierarchical regression statistics predicting child mental and non-mental state 
language at Time 3, child performance on the emotion situation task, and mother use of mental state 
language at Time 3 
Variable ~ t R2 and 
f..R.2 
_, -, 
Dependent variable = Child total mental state talk at Time 3 
Step 1: All Time 2 child language, mother performance on emotion 
tasks, SES. .38 
Step 2: Time 2 mother desire talk, mother emotion talk, mother 
/ 
think/know talk .1Qa 
t';. Dependent variable = Child total mental state talk at Time 3 
t>-
Step 1: All Time 2 child language, mother performance on emotion 
> tasks, SES, Time 2 mother emotion talk, Time 2 mother think/know 
talk .45 
., Step 2: 
"r Time 2 RDLS total .04 .30 
"> Time 2 MCDI words .29 1.43 
Time MCDI syntax .23 1.16 
Mother performance on emotion tasks .23 .20 
~· SES -.11 -.95 
-\ Time 2 mother emotion talk .07 1.31 
't 
Time 2 mother think/know talk .16 1.32 
Time 2 mother desire talk .19 1.67 .03 
j 
> Dependent variable = Child total mental state talk at Time 3 -, 
Step 1: All Time 2 child language, Time 2 mother desire talk, Time 2 




Time 2 RDLS total .04 .34 
} 
Time 2 MCDI words .30 1.48 >, 
Time MCDI syntax .21 1.10 
'.\' 
Mother performance on emotion tasks .02 .16 ,'.) 
SES -.12 -1.04 
Time 2 mother desire talk .25 '2.13 
Time 2 mother think/know talk .18 1.49 
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Variable t R2 and 
!:,R.2 
Time 2 mother emotion talk .09 .87 .01 
Dependent variable = Child total mental state talk at Time 3 
Step 1: All Time 2 child language, Time 2 mother desire talk, Time 2 
mother emotion talk, mother performance on emotion tasks, and SES .47 
( 
Step 2: 
Time 2 RDLS total .04 .30 
Time 2 MCDI words .29 1.43 
Time MCDI syntax .23 1.58 
Mother performance on emotion tasks .02 .21 
~ SES -.11 -.95 
Time 2 mother emotion talk .07 .66 
Time 2 mother desire talk .22 1.89 
., 
Time 2 mother think/know talk .20 1.67 .02 
',  
;" Dependent variable = Child performance on emotion situation task at Time 3 
Step 1: All Time 2 child language, mother performance on emotion 
task, Time 2 child performance on emotion situation task and SES 
.20 
"' Step 2: 
' Time 2 total RDLS .15 .84 ·, 
'( 
Time 2 MCDI words -.71 -2.79b 
( Time 2 MCDI syntax .60 2.59a 
)' 
I Mother performance on emotion task -.33 -2.30a 
'.>-
Time 2 child performance on emotion situation task .19 1.38 :, 
SES .06 .41 
v 
Time 2 think/know talk .38 2.98 .na 
:~ 
Dependent variable = Mother think/know talk at Time 3 
)-
Step 1: Time 2 mother think/know talk .35 
Step 2: Time 2 child MCDI total mental state language .07 .71 .01 
Note. p = standardized regression coefficient. R2 = proportion of variance explained by variable . 
. ' 
< 
!:,R.2 = change in proportion of variance explained by a variable (i.e., additional variance explained by a -~! 
variable). MCDI refers to the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory. a p < .05 (all significance 
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5.10.1 Summary 
To summarize, at 24 months mother think/know talk was the more 
consistent predictor of later child mental state talk and performance on the 
emotion task (correlating with 4/6 variables). Nevertheless, mother 
think/know talk did not account for unique variance of later child mental state 
talk after accounting for the variance in child mental state talk due to earlier 
mother desire and emotion talk (see Table 5.10). However, think/know talk at 
Time 2 did account for unique variance in child performance on the emotion 
situation task at Time 3. Thus, it seems that several types of mother mental 
state talk a.re important at Time 2. I also examined mother non-mental state 
talk. Mother talk about 'links' correlated with 1/ 6 later child variables and was 
not a unique predictor when mother think/know talk was accounted for. 
Finally, there was no evidence for a bi-directionality effect, in that the extent to 
which children used mental state talk did not predict how much mental state 
talk mothers used. 
5.11 Chapter summary of results 
To summarize across all the time points, at 15 months mother talk about 
desires was the more consistent correlate of child talk about mental states and 
emotion understanding nine months later (see Table 5.14), contributing unique 
variance (see Table 5.10). At 24 months however, the pattern changes and 
mother talk about thoughts and knowledge was a more consistent predictor of 
a child's later talk about mental states and emotion understanding (see Table 
5.14). Talk about thoughts and knowledge accounted for unique variance in 
children's performance on the emotion situation task (see Table 5.13). Mothers' 
talk about desires and emotions were still important, however, contributing 
along with talk about thoughts and knowledge to variance in later child talk 
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Table 5.14. Number of significant partial correlations between mother mental state language, the 
referent of mental state language and later child mental state language and emotion understanding. 
15 - 24 monthsl 15 - 33 months2 24 - 33 months2 
Mother language 
Emotion 0 0 2 
Desire 4 0 2 
Think/know 0 1 4 
92 
Note. 1Total of five child mental state language and emotion task measures. 2Total of six child 
mental state language and emotion task measures. 
> 
•r 
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Chapter 6 Results II: The relation 
between maternal references to the 
child versus others and children's later 
mental state language and emotion 
understanding 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present the results pertaining to the final 
goal of this thesis: To consider the importance of the referent of mental state 
talk, in other words, how does mother mental state talk that refers to the child 
versus another person relate to children's later acquisition of mental state 
concepts and emotion understanding? As stated in section 3.5, I hypothesized 
that: (1) talk about the child's mental states will be particularly important, 
especially for children between 15 and 24 months of age and that (2) there are 
reasons for thinking that a transition in the referring style of mothers occurs 
during the early preschool years and that this transition is mediated to a large 
extent by the zone of proximal development and the language abilities of the 
child. For these reasons, I hypothesized that mother talk about others' mental 
states at 24 months of age would be more important for children's social 
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6.2 Descriptive statistics 
In the following analyses, I considered whether mothers referred to their 
own, the child's or the depicted character's mental states (see Table 6.1). 
References to emotion were not analyzed into separate referent categories as 
the vast majority of emotion terms referred to the emotions depicted in the 
picture books. Composite scores for other, self and child categories at both time 
points were created collapsing across desire, know/ think and other mental 
state (see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics for mother mental state references to other, self and child at Times 1, 2 
and3 
Timel Time2 Time3 
N=74 N=74 N=72 
M{SD) Range M(SD) Range M(SD) Range 
Total other 1.34(1.56) 0- 6.00 1.34 (1.52) 0- 6.67 2.07(1.86) 0 - 6.67 
Total mother 0.78(1.11) 0- 5.00 1.28 (1.44) 0 - 6.43 2.24(2.20) 0 - 7.25 
Total child 3.05(2.14) 0-10.00 2.99 (2.58) 0-11.56 7.09(4.44) 0- 22.52 
Desire other 1.00(1.19) 0- 5.47 1.16 (1.34) 0- 5.56 1.69(1.55) 0 - 6.41 
Desire mother 0.03(0.15) 0- 0.97 0.01 (0.07) 0- 0.63 0.09(0.27) 0 - 1.22 
Desire child 2.15(1.91) 0- 8.82 1.16 (1.63) 0-10.68 1.10(1.34) 0 - 5.10 
Think/know 0.14(0.47) 0- 2.72 0.18 (0.47) 0 - 2.86 0.36 (.86) 0 - 4.65 
other 
Think/know 0.73(1.07) 0- 5.00 1.22 (1.40) 0 - 6.43 2.29(2.15) 0 - 7.25 
mother 
Think/know 0.63(1.04) 0- 5.37 1.81 (2.11) 0 - 9.52 5.51(3.78) 0 - 13.48 
child 
Other mental 0.26(0.66) 0- 4.08 0.004 (0.03) 0 - 0.29 0.02(.09) 0 - 0.52 
state other 
Other mental 0.01(0.09) 0- 0.76 0.06 (0.20) 0 - 0.59 0.06(.23) 0 - 1.48 
state mother 
Other mental 0.27(0.73) 0- 4.76 0.02 (0.09) 0 - 1.06 0.24(.56) 0 - 3.30 
state child 
6.3 Changes across time in mother mental state 
references to child 
My first analysis was to examine how the relative proportion of maternal 
references to the child's, another's and the mother's own mental states changed 
over time. I analyzed the individual mental state terms separately by referent 
over time using a 3 (Time: Time 1, Time 2, Time 3) x 3 (Referent: Child, Self, 
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Other) x 2 (Mental state type: desire, think/know2) repeated measures analysis 
of variance. There were four significant effects: a main effect of time, F(2,68) = 
59.84, p < .001, 112= .46, referent type, F(2,68) = 108.38, p < .001, 112= .61, mental 
state type, F(l,69) = 20.23, p < .001, 112= .23, and a three-way interaction between 
mental state type, referent, and time, F(4,66) = 56.86, p < .001, 11 2= .45. In order 
to explore the three-way interaction, I conducted separate analyses of variance, 
between Times 1 and 2, Times 1 and 3 and Times 2 and 3. These analyses are 
reported in the following three sections. The trends across all three time points 
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Figure 6-1. Changes across time in mother talk about the child's, her own and others' mental 
states 
6.3.1 Changes across time in mother mental state 
references to child versus other within individual mental 
states, between Time 1 - Time 2 
In this analysis I explored the interaction between Times 1 and 2 mother 
mental state referents with six one-way analyses of variance (applying Holm's 
correction). There were three significant effects. Mothers significantly 
2 Given the very small numbers of other mental states (see Table 6.1), I did not include 
them in the analysis, but rather concentrated on the main mental states of desire and belief. 
•-\ 
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decreased their references to the child's desires at the second time point, F(l,73) = 
11.86, p =.001, rJ2 = .14, but increased their references to the child's knowledge and 
thinking threefold from Time 1 to Time 2, F(l,73) = 24.67, p < .001, 112 = .25, and 
increased references to their own knowledge and thinking at the second time 
point, F(l,73) = 8.69, p < .01, 112 = .11. 
6.3.2 Changes across time in mother mental state 
references to child versus other within individual mental 
states, between Time 1 - Time 3 
I next conducted six one-way analyses of variance to explore the 
interaction between Time 1 and 3 mother mental state talk again applying 
Holms correction to ensure family-wise error was less than .05. Between time 
points 1 and 3, there was a significant decrease in references to the child's 
desires F(l, 68) = 16.04, p < .001, 112 = .19, whereas references to others' desires 
increased significantly, F(l, 68) = 11.15, p < .001, 112 = .14. References to the 
mothers' beliefs increased significantly, F(l, 68) = 30.73, p < .001, 112 = .31, as 
well as references to the child's thoughts and knowledge, F(l, 68) = 123.47, p < 
.001, 112 = .65. 
6.3.3 Changes across time in mother mental state 
references to child versus other within individual mental 
states, between Time 2 - Time 3 
Finally, I conducted another six analyses of variance to explore the 
interaction between Time 2 and 3 mother mental state talk. After applying 
Holms correction, only references to the mother's thoughts and knowledge, F(l, 
70) = 22.23, p < .001, 112 = .25, and the child's thoughts and knowledge, F(l, 70) 
= 88.07, p < .001, 112 = .56, increased significantly. 
6.3.4 Summary 
To summarize, at 15 months mothers talked most about their child's 
desires. By the time children reached 24 months, mothers talked significantly 
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their child's thoughts and knowledge. Between 24 and 33 months, mothers' 
references to the child's, others' and her own desires did not significantly 
change whereas her talk about the child's and the mothers' thoughts and 
knowledge significantly increased (see Figure 6-1). 
6.4 Consistency in mother mental state references to 
child versus other across time 
I also examined consistencies between mother mental state use across 
time (see Table 6.2). Of particular interest was whether mothers were 
consistent across time in their use of specific kinds of talk. In general there 
were many consistencies: Mother talk about another's desires at Time 1 
correlated with mother talk about another's desires at Time 2. Mother talk 
about the child's thoughts and knowledge correlated over Times 2 and 3 as did 
their talk about their own thoughts and knowledge over Times 2 and 3. There 
were no correlations between mothers' mental state talk at Times 1 and 3. 
Mother references to others' desires at Time 2 also correlated with 
others' desires at Time 3. Mother talk about the child's thoughts and 
knowledge correlated between Times 2 and 3, as did mother talk about others' 
thoughts and knowledge between Times 2 and 3 and references to her own 
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Table 6.2. Inter-correlations between mother mental state lan:;;uag_e (sep_arated by_ referent) at Times 1, 2 and 3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Tl desire child 
2. Tl desire other .01 
3. Tl desire mother .02 .16 
4. Tl think/know child -.19 .17 .19 
5. Tl think/know other -.11 .35** .42** .23* 
6. Tl think/know -.05 .20 .08 .42** .24* 
mother 
7. T2 desire child .03 -.04 -.02 .06 -.10 -.10 
8. T2 desire other -.08 .27* .00 .13 .15 .24* -.11 
9. T2 desire mother .06 -.10 -.03 -.07 -.04 -.08 -.04 -.05 
10. T2 think/know 
.01 .09 -.02 .31** .02 .14 -.07 .47** -.10 
child 
11. T2 think/know 
.04 .08 .12 .22 .20 .10 -.12 .23* -.05 .073 
other 
12. T2 think/know 
.04 .08 .28* .39** .12 
mother 
.38** -.12 .26* -.05 .29* .30* 
13. T3 desire child .09 .02 .00 -.05 .10 -.02 -.00 .17 -.09 -.01 -.04 .18 
14. T3 desire other -.04 .36** -.01 .08 -.11 -.00 -.05 .29* -.13 .26* .11 .13 -.11 
15. T3 desire mother -.01 -.16 -.01 .11 -.01 -.08 .00 -.14 -.04 .06 -.10 .05 .20 -.12 
16. T3 think/know -.25* .13 -.05 .18 .00 .04 -.03 
child 
.26* -.14 .48** .14 .12 .05 .21 .09 
17. T3 think/know 
-.00 -.08 -.06 
other 
.13 .01 .06 .02 .29* -.05 .26* .51** .19 -.08 .14 -.08 .38** 
18. T3 think/know 
-.11 .11 .19 
mother 
.23 .10 .15 .07 .34** -.13 .34** .13 .54** .21 .37** -.03 .11 .12 
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Relation between the referent of mother talk about 
the child's and others' mental states, across all mental 
states and later child mental state language and emotion 
understanding at Times 1, 2, 3 
The following analyses address the question of the predictive role of the 
referent of mother talk and children's later mental state talk and emotion 
understanding. 
Table 6.3 includes zero-order correlations and Table 6.4 includes partial 
correlation analyses between maternal references to the child's, another's and 
her own references to mental states ( collapsed across all mental states) and later 
child mental state language and emotion task performance. The partial 
correlational analyses account for any shared variance with SES, total child 
language, mother performance on emotion tasks, and any shared correlates 
from Table 6.3 (see Table 6.4 note). The trends were very similar for the raw 
and the partial correlations. For this reason, the summaries below report on the 
partial correlations, the more stringent analyses. 
~ .·_·--.-- - ·v··· 
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Table 6.3. Zero-order correlations between mother mental state references to other, self and child at Times 1 and 2 and later child mental state language and emotion task 
er ormance 
MCDI child mental state language at Times 2 and 3 Emotion tasks at Times 2 and 3 
Emotion Desire Think/ Total mental Emotion situation Body 
know state emotion 
Mother Languagel T2 T3 T2 T3 T3 T2 T3 T2 T3 T2 T3 
Tl total other .11 .04 .02 -.05 .06 .09 .04 .08 .06 -.14 .11 
Tl total self .07 .00 -.01 .16 .10 .04 .08 .10 .14 .02 .07 
Tl total self + other .09 .03 -.00 .03 .09 .06 .06 .07 .10 -.13 .13 
Tl total child .25* .07 .31** .11 .08 .29* .08 .30* .28* .10 .03 
T2 total other - .24* - .14 .08 - .22 - .32** - .24* 
T2 total self - .27* - .25* .04 - .26* - .07 - .11 
T2 total self + other - .30** - .23 .07 - .29* - .24* - .22 
T2 total child - .28* - .17 .09 - .24* - .25* - .07 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01 (all significance tests are one-tailed). 1 Not including emotion terms as these referred only to others' emotions. 
-· - r 
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Table 6.4. Partial correlations between mother re[!rences to others, self and child at Times 1 and 2 and later child mental state language and emotion task performance 
MCDI child mental state language at Times 2 and 3 Emotion tasks at Times 2 and 3 
Emotion Desire Belief Total mental Emotion Body 
state situation emotion 
Tl mother talkl T2 T3 T2 T3 T3 T2 T3 T2 T3 T2 T3 
Others .20* .06 .03 .02 .12 .16 .08 .03 .01 .20 .06 
Mother .04 -.08 .07 .15 .07 .01 .01 .09 .14 .03 .06 
Other + mother .15 .02 -.02 .09 .11 .10 .07 -.01 .11 -.17 .11 
Child .23* .04 .29** .07 .07 .26* .05 .36** .30** .18 .01 
T2 mother talk2 
Other .25a* .16 .08 .28* .29a* .24* 
Mother .36a** .39a** .09 .39a** .12 .09 
Other + mother .38a** .34** .11 .41a** .23a* .22 
Child .17b .08 -.03 .08 .16b .01 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01 (all significance tests are one-tailed). 1Partialling all child talk at Time 1, SES and mother performance on emotion recognition tasks. 
2Partialling out all child talk at Time 2, SES and mother performance on emotion tasks. a Also accounting for shared correlate of references to child. b Also 
accounting for shared correlate of references to self/ other. 
\ 
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6.5.1 Time 1 -Time 2 and Time 3 
At Time 1, mother talk about the child's rather than others' mental states 
was the more consistent correlate of Time 2 child mental state language and 
emotion task performance, correlating with 4 out of 5 measures (see Table 6.4). 
This was also broadly true for the relation between Time 1 and Time 3 in which 
mother talk about the child's mental states rather than others' mental states 
correlated with emotion situation task performance at Time 3 (see Table 6.4). 
6.5.2 Time 2 - Time 3 
In contrast to Time 1, at Time 2 mother talk about the child's mental 
states did not correlate with the child's Time 3 total mental state talk or 
performance on the emotion tasks. Rather, mother references to others 
(including herself and the characters in the book) were the more consistent 
correlates of later child mental state language and emotion task performance, 
correlating with 4 out of 6 measures (see Table 6.4). 
6.5.3 Summary 
Table 6.5 contains a summary of the number of unique significant partial 
correlations. So far, the predictive analyses have shown that initially, at 15 
months, referring to the child's mental states is more consistently predictive of 
a child's Time 2 social understanding than referring to others' mental states. 
The reverse situation was observed however at 24 months, when referring to 
others' ( other + mother) mental states was a more consistent predictor of 
children's social understanding than referring to the child. 
7/ '\J>. 'v 
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Table 6.6. Zero-order correlations between mother mental state references to other, self and child at Times 1 and 2 and later child mental state langu.age and emotion task 
performance 
MCDI child mental state language at Times 2 and 3 Emotion tasks at Times 2 and 3 
Emotion Desire Think/ Total mental state Emotion situation Body emotion 
know 
Mother Language1 T2 T3 T2 T3 T3 T2 T3 T2 T3 T2 T3 
Tl desire other .23* .05 .10 .03 .03 .20 .05 .08 .01 -.09 .06 
Tl desire mother .07 -.00 .21 .01 .14 .12 .05 .00 -.05 -.19 .13 
Tl desire mother + other .23* .05 .12 -.05 .05 .21 .05 .08 .00 -.11 .07 
Tl desire child .26* .08 .26* .11 .10 .29* .08 .27* .12 -.01 .00 
Tl think/know other -.14 -.11 -.11 -.14 -.02 -.14 -.10 .04 .18 -.14 .07 
Tl think/know mother .07 .01 -.03 .18 .09 .04 .08 .12 .15 .19 .06 
Tl think/know mother+ .01 -.03 -.07 .10 .07 -.02 .03 .11 .19 .01 .07 
other 
Tl think/know child .05 .02 .05 .06 -.04 .04 .05 .11 .18 .08 .07 
T2 desire other - .25* - .17 .14 - .23* - .38** - .15 
T2 desire mother - .01 - -.01 -.06 - .04 - .02 - .24* 
T2 desire mother + other - .25* - .17 .13 - .24* - .38** - .17 
T2 desire child - -.01 - -.04 -.01 - -.01 - -.14 - .04 
T2 think/know other - .06 - -.02 -.09 - .05 - -.00 - .29* 
T2 think/know mother - .27* - .25* .06 - .26* - .06 - .11 
T2 think/know mother + - .24* - .20 .02 - .24* - .05 - .19 
other 
T2 think/know child - .35* - .24* .12 - .30** - .43** - .06 
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6.6.1 Time 1 -Times 2 and 3 
The partial correlations in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 indicate whether one 
type of mother talk - for instance, talk about others' thoughts and knowledge -
is still related to later child mental state language and emotion task 
performance, even after accounting for other types of mother talk (see Table 6.6 
above for shared correlates). 
I first consider the partial correlations between the referent of mother 
mental state talk, at Time 1 and children's social understanding at Time 2 and 
Time 3, (see Table 6.7). To recall from the previous chapter, mother talk about 
desires (at Time 1) was the only correlate of a child's later mental state talk and 
emotion understanding at Time 2. In fact, moth~r talk about the child's desires 
was the most consistent correlate of later child mental state talk and emotion 
task performance (4 of 5 correlations significant), whereas mother talk about 
others' desires correlated 2 out of 5 times (see Table 6.7). 
There was no relation between mother references to others' or the child's 
desires and thoughts/knowledge at Time 1 and later mental state talk and task 
performance at Time 3. 
I next conducted a similar analysis, but one examining the partial 
correlations between the referent of mothers' mental state talk and children's 
social understanding between Time 2 and Time 3. 
- ---_ - - --- -~~--
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Table 6.7. Partial correlations between mother references to child's versus others' desires and beliefs at Time 1 and child MCDI mental state language and performance on 
emotion task at Times 2 and 31_ 
Tl mother talk1 
Other desires 
Mother desires 





Other + mother 
think/know 


































































































Child thinkLknow .03 -.04 .04 .04 -.10 .03 -.01 .13 .17 .17 .03 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01 (all significance tests are one-tailed). 1All partial correlations account for all child talk at Time 1, SES and mother performance on 
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6.6.2 Time 2 -Time 3 
Table 6.8 includes partial correlations between the referent of mothers' 
mental state language and children's later social understanding at Time 3 
(accounting for shared correlates and potentially confounding variables - see 
Table 6.8 note). 
The most consistent correlate was mother talk about her own or another's 
thoughts and knowledge (mother + other) at Time 2, correlating with 3/ 6 
measures at Time 3. In contrast, mother talk about the child's thoughts and 
knowledge at Time 2 only correlated with 1/6 measures at Time 3. Mother talk 
about the child's desires at Time 2 correlated negatively with performance on 
the emotion situation task at Time 3. 
Table 6.8 . Partial correlations between mother references to child versus others desires and 
thoughts/knowledge at Time 2 and child MCDI mental state language and performance on emotion tasks 
at Time 31 
Time 2 mother talk 
Others' desires 
Mother desires 




Other + mother 
think/know 
Child mental state language and emotion understanding at Time 3 













































Child think/know .133,5 -.033 -.11 .043,5 .395** -.004 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01 (all significance tests are one-tailed). lAll partial correlations account for 
all child talk at Time 2, SES and mother performance on emotion tasks. 2Also accounting for 
child think/know talk. 3 Also accounting for mother think/know talk. 4Also accounting for 
other think/know talk. SAlso accounting for other desire talk. MCDI refers to the McArthur 
Communicative Development Inventories. 
6.6.3 Summary 
Table 6.9 contains a summary of the number of significant partial 
correlations between the referent (self, other, mother) of mother talk about 
desires and thoughts/knowledge, and children's later social understanding. 

























CHAPTER 6: RESULTS II 108 
to the child's desires was a more consistent correlate than referring to others' 
desires. When children were older, that is between 24 and 33 months, referring 
to others' thoughts and knowledge became the more consistent correlate of 
children's later social understanding. 
Table 6.9. Number of significant partial correlations between mother mental state language, the referent 
of mother mental state language and later child mental state language and emotion understanding. 
15 - 24 months1 15 - 33 months2 24 - 33 months2 
Desire 
Child 4 0 1* 
Other 2 0 0 
Mother 0 0 0 
Mother +other 2 0 0 
Think/know 
Child 0 0 1 
Other 0 0 1 
Mother 0 0 3 
Mother + other 0 0 3 
Note. 1 Total of five child mental state language and emotion task measures. 2Total of six child 
mental state language and emotion task measures. * indicates a negative correlation. 
6.7 Children's pronoun use as a mediating factor in 
mothers' mental state referring style 
In the previous chapter, the results indicated that mothers' tendency to 
refer to mental states was not driven by children's mental state usage or their 
ability on the emotion situation task. In other words, the relation between 
mothers' use of mental state language and children's later mental state 
language and emotion understanding was unidirectional. 
Below, I examine one factor - children's use of pronouns - which could 
potentially influence mothers', tendency to refer to their own, others' or the 
child's mental states. I explore this by examining the relation between 
children's reported personal pronoun use at Time 1 and Time 2 and mothers' 
tendency to refer to the child's, her own and others' mental states at Time 2 and 
Time 3. Recall that pronoun competence (i.e., greater use of pronouns as rated 
by mothers on questionnaires) has also been related to the development of 
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& Ramsay, 2004). These findings suggest that pronoun use may act as a 
marker of a nascent understanding of the self-other distinction 
I first consider the changes in children's understanding and production 
of personal pronouns between Times 1 and 2 (Time 3 cannot be examined since 
mothers were not ask to report on pronoun use on the CDI III). 
Figure 6-2 depicts the increase in the percentage of children who were 
reported to understand and/ or produce at least one pronoun (e.g., 1st "I" , 2nd 
"you" or 3rd "she") at Time 1 and those reported to produce pronouns (1st, 2nd, 
3rd) at Time 2. Very few children at Time 1 were reported to be producing 
pronouns; however, the data suggest that some children at least are reported to 
understand pronouns at Time 1. Comparisons, cannot be made however, 
between Times 1 and Times 2 because the variables are not exactly the same 
(comprehension versus production). The graph is intended only to give an 
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Figure 6-2. Percentage of children reported to use and or understand at least one 1st, 2nd or 3rd 
person pronoun at Time 1, and percentage of children reported to use at least one 1st, 2nd or 3rd 
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The first analysis examined whether children's tendency to understand 
or use pronouns at 15 and 24 months influenced the extent to which mothers 
referred to her own, others' or the child's mental states in general. 
Table 6.10 shows that children's use of 1st person pronouns (I, me) at 
Time 2 correlated with mothers' references to others' mental states, both within 
the time point and later at time point 3. There were no correlations between 
children's reported understanding and/ or use of pronouns at Time 1 and 
mothers' referring pattern for mental states at Time 2 or Time 3. 
Table 6.10. Zero-order correlations between children's pronouns at Times 1 and 2 
Time 1 MCDI pronounsl Time 2 MCDI pronouns2 
Mother Talk 181 person 2nd person 3rd person l 81 person 2nd person 3rd person 
Time2 
Child -.02 -.08 -.12 .19 .20* -.05 
Other -.04 -.07 -.06 .29* -.08 -.15 
Mother .04 -.05 -.09 1v 
"{ 
-.07 -.09 
Mother + other -.00 -.07 -.09 .28* -.09 -.15 
Time3 
Child -.26* -.10 -.24* .15 -.17 .01 
Other -.08 .04 -.03 .21* .01 -.05 
Mother .10 .04 .01 .33** .12 -.07 
Mother + other .05 .09 -.01 .34** .09 -.07 
Note. p* < .05; p **< .01. All significance tests are one-tailed. 1Children understand or 
understand and also produce pronouns. 2Children' s ability to produce pronouns. MCDI refers 
to the MacArthur Child Development Inventories 
Given that children's general language use is related to mothers' 
language use, and also that mother language is related over time, I conducted 
further analyses which accounted for these potentially confounding variables 
(see Table 6.11) . Using linear regression, I examined the significant 
longitudinal correlations by entering in the first step children's general 
language (excluding their use of pronouns) at Time 2 and mothers' references to 
others' or her own mental states at Time 2 ( depending on the criterion), 
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shows that a large bulk of the variance in mothers' tendency to refer to her own 
mental states at Time 3 is attributable to her own referring style at Time 2 and 
to the child's general language abilities at Time 2. Children's use of personal 
pronouns at Time 2, however, accounts for a small, but significant portion of 
the variance. Children's personal pronoun use did not contribute any further 
variance in mothers' tendency to refer to others' mental states at Time 3, after 
taking in to account other potential confounding variables (mothers' tendency 
to refer to others' mental states at Time 2 and children's language at Time 2). 
Table 6.11. Summary of hierarchical regression statistics predicting mothers' mental state referent at 
Times 2 and3 
Variable 
Dependent variable = Mother references to others' mental states 
at Time 3 
Step 1: All Time 2 child language, mother references to 
others' mental states at Time 2 
Step 2: 
All Time 2 child language (excluding pronouns) 
Mother references to others' mental states at Time 2 
Children's 1st person pronouns at Time 2 
Dependent variable = Mother references to her awn' mental 
states at Time 3 
Step 1: All Time 2 child language (excluding pronouns) 




-.04 -.35 .00 
Mother references to her own mental states at Time 2 .40 
Step 2: 
All Time 2 child language, .16 1.56 
Mother references to her own mental states at Time 2 .54 5.72c 
Children's 1st person pronouns at Time 2 .19 1.82a .03 
Note. p = standardized regression coefficient. R2 = proportion of variance explained by variable. 
till_2 = change in proportion of variance explained by a variable (i.e., additional variance 
explained by a variable). MCDI refers to the MacArthur Communicative Development 
Inventory. ap < .05, bp < .01, cp < .01 (all significance tests are one-tailed). 
6.7.1 Is there a reciprocal relation between mothers' 
referring style and children's pronoun production? 
I next examined the reciprocal relation, that is, is it the case that mothers' 
tendency to refer to others' and her own mental states relates to children's 
production of 1st person pronouns. As children's pronoun use was not assessed 
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talk about others at Time 1 and children's pronoun use at Time 2. Table 6.12 
contains the hierarchical regression statistics. The results indicate that mothers' 
referring style at Time 1 did not influence children's pronoun production at 
Time 2. Furthermore, children's language abilities or their tendency to 
understand or use pronouns at Time 1 does not influence their 1st person 
pronoun production at Time 2. 
Table 6.12. Summary of hierarchical regression statistics predicting children's 1st person pronoun 
production at Time 2 
Variable 
Dependent variable= Children's pronoun production at Time 2 
Step 1: All child language at Time 1, children's 1st person 
pronoun understanding/use at Time 1 
Step 2: 
Child MCDI productive language at Time 1 
Child MCDI observed language at Time 1 
Child MCDI receptive language at Time 1 
Children's 1st person pronoun understanding/ use at Time 1 
Time 1 mother references to her own mental states (across all 
mental states) 
Dependent variable= Children's pronoun production at Time 2 
Step 1: All child language at Time 1, children's 1st person 
pronoun understanding/ use at Time 1 
Step 2: 
Child MCDI productive language at Time 1 
Child MCDI observed language at Time 1 
Child MCDI receptive language at Time 1 
Children's 1st person pronoun understanding/ use at Time 1 
Time 1 mother references to others' mental states (across all 
mental states) 
Dependent variable= Children's pronoun production at Time 2 
Step 1: All child language at Time 1, children's 1st person 
pronoun understanding/use at Time 1 
Step 2: 
Child MCDI productive language at Time 1 
Child MCDI observed language at Time 1 
Child MCDI receptive language at Time 1 
Children's 1st person pronoun understanding/ use at Time 1 




































mental states) .00 -.00 .00 
Note. p = standardized regression coefficient. R2 = proportion of variance explained by variable. 
£lR2 = change in proportion of variance explained by a variable (i.e., additional variance 
explained by a variable). MCDI refers to the MacArthur Communicative Development 
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6.8 Results I and Results II Summary 
The primary focus of the first results chapter was to examine how the 
different types of mother mental state talk (emotion, desire, think/know) were 
related to later child mental state talk and emotion task performance. A 
summary of the numbers of significant correlations for all three pairs of time 
points is presented in Table 6.13. The main finding was that between 15 and 24 
months, mothers' references to the child's desires were the primary correlates 
( accounting for unique variance) of children's later social understanding. 
Between 24 and 33 months, desire still remained a significant predictor, and 
talk about emotions was also now a significant predictor. However, thoughts 
and knowledge was the most consistent predictor of children's later social 
understanding. 
In order to explore in more detail, the mechanism by which mental state 
talk facilitates children's social understanding, the second Results chapter 
examined the relation between the referent (child, other, mother) of mothers' 
mental state talk and later child mental state talk and emotion task 
performance. 
Table 6.13 contains the numbers of significant partial correlations 
between children's later social understanding and the referring style across all 
mental states as well as the referring style for individual mental states. Across 
all mental states, mothers' tendency to refer to the child's rather than others' 
mental states at 15 months was a more consistent correlate of children's social 
understanding nine months later. When I examined the individual mental 
states, referring to the child's desires, rather than their thoughts/knowledge 
was predictive of social understanding at 24 months. At 24 months, a different 
pattern emerged. In this case, referring to others' mental states (mothers + 
others) was a unique correlate of children's later social understanding. 
Referring to children's mental states (across all mental states) was no longer 
predictive. When I examined the individual mental states, the more consistent 
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tendency to refer to others' (including her own) thoughts and knowledge. 
Referring to the child's thoughts and knowledge was less consistent a predictor, 
accounting for only one significant correlation. 
Finally, I examined whether children's use of pronouns were predictive 
of mothers' referring style. I was interested in the period between 24 months 
and 33 months as this is a time when children are reported to be using 
pronouns consistently in their speech. After accounting for potentially 
confounding variables such as children's general language abilities and 
mothers' tendency to refer to her own, others' or the child's mental states, there 
was a relation between children who were reported to use 1st person pronouns 
at 24 months and mothers' tendency to refer to her own mental states nine 
months later. Moreover, this relation was unidirectional in that mothers' 
referring style at an earlier time point (Time 1) did not predict children's later 
use of 1st person pronouns. 
Table 6.13. Number of significant partial correlations between mother mental state language, the 
referent of mental state language and later child mental state language and emotion task understanding. 
Mother mental state 15 - 24 monthsl 15 - 33 months2 24 - 33 months2 
Ian a e 
Emotion 0 0 2 
Desire 4 0 2 
Think/know 0 1 4 
Reference across all 
mental states 
Total child 4 1 0 
Total other 1 0 4 
Total mother 0 0 3 
Total mother +other 0 0 4 
Desire 
Child 4 0 1* 
Other 2 0 0 
Mother 0 0 0 
Mother +other 2 0 0 
Think/know 
Child 0 0 1 
Other 0 0 1 
Mother 0 0 3 
Mother + other 0 0 3 
Note. 1 Total of five child mental state language and emotion task measures. 2Total of six child 
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"the words are sitting in our ear, when they get a bit hot, it comes out of your ear, in your head, 
down a little slide and out of your mouth and words come out" 
115 
Helen (aged 4) explaining how language works. 
Chapter 7 Discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to address the question of how 
maternal input facilitates a child's developing social understanding within 
an explicit theoretical framework: Vygotsky' s zone of proximal 
development. Vygotsky' s principle thesis is that individual functioning (in 
this case mind understanding) is facilitated by social processes. Specifically 
applied, this general construct underlies the principle components of the 
zone of proximal development: (1) the child's level of actual functioning 
and (2) the child's potential functioning. The transition from the first 
component to the next occurs within a supported social environment, 
which has come to be known as scaffolding. 
7.2 Summary of hypotheses 
\ 
The theory that social understanding or early 'theory of mind' could 
be mediated by maternal input within a zone of proximal development 
generated two principle hypotheses in this study. First, I argued that the 
incremental and differential exposure to mental state language - first 
desires, then knowledge and thinking - during a child's early years, may 
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type of mental state (such as desires or emotions), which emerges early, 
may assist in the understanding of other types of mental states as well as 
mental life in general. 
Second, I argued that (a) maternal mental state talk that takes as its 
referent the child, is initially more important than references to others' 
mental states, and (b) referring to the child would scaffold increasingly 
more complex mental state concepts before broadening the referent to 
include others' mental states. 
In addressing these two broad hypotheses there were three main 
goals to the study: 
Goal 1. To chart the changes in mother mental and non-mental 
state language across time. 
Goal 2. To examine the relation between mother references to 
different types of mental states (e.g., desires versus thoughts/knowledge) 
and later child mental state language and emotion understanding. 
Goal 3. To investigate the relation between the referent of 
mothers' mental state language and children's learning about mental states. 
7.3 Goal 1: Changes in mothers' mental state talk 
overtime 
Consistent with the 'zone of proximal' development hypotheses, 
and with the empirical findings of Beeghly et al. (1986) and Ruffman et al. 
(2002), I predicted that talk about desires would initially be more plentiful 
than talk about thoughts and knowledge, with talk about thoughts and 
knowledge increasing with age relative to desire talk. 
As predicted the first main finding was that mothers talked most 
about desire when children were 15 months of age, whereas mother talk 
about thoughts and knowledge increased more than four times between 15 
months and 33 months. Similarly, there was a significant increase in talk 
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hand, mother talk about desires and emotions remained relatively stable 
between 15 and 33 months. 
These results extend those of Beeghly et al. (1986) in three ways. 
First I demonstrated this pattern in a much larger sample size (7 4 as 
opposed to 28). Second I examined mother talk within a picture description 
context, thus demonstrating that such findings were not restricted to a 
specific communicative context. Third and perhaps most importantly, I 
examined the changes in mother desire talk and think/know talk 
specifically, whereas Beeghly et al. did not isolate desire and think/know 
talk. This study also extends the Ruffman et al. study by providing 
evidence within a similar language context (i.e., picture describing) for this 
pattern of mother talk one and a half years earlier. Furthermore, these 
findings are also consistent with a study conducted by Brown and Dunn 
(1991) who found that mother talk about desire and emotions was also 
stable between 24 and 36 months. Again consistent with my study, Brown 
and Dunn found that mother talk about 'mental states' which included 
thoughts and knowledge, modulations of assertion and other mental states 
all increased significantly between 24 and 33 months. My study extends 
Brown and Dunn's findings by examining 7 4 participants ( as opposed to 
just six), by extending the analysis of the trend in mother mental state talk 
to incorporate a younger group of children (15 as opposed to 24 months), 
and by providing evidence within a different parent-child context (picture 
description). 
7.3.1 What governs the incremental exposure to desires 
versus thoughts/knowledge? 
I highlighted in Chapter 3 several reasons why mother talk about 
desires would be more plentiful when children were younger. The first 
reason I proposed was that tell-tale facial expressions and actions make 
infants' desires salient and thus easier for mothers to infer than infants' 
knowledge or beliefs (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982). 
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Bretherton and Beeghly (1982) suggest that the late appearance of 
cognitive terms is due to the lack of direct contextual information 
accompanying these terms. They suggest that desire talk is acquired earlier 
because it is easier to make inferences about others' desires than about 
people's thoughts (i.e., parents can point to what they want and what they 
think the child wants, whereas they can't point to "thinking"). In addition, 
desires are likely to be highly salient to children in that their daily existence 
will be marked by attempts to change the world to fit their desires. This 
also makes mothers more likely to comment on children's desires than they 
would children's thinking or knowing. 
Evidence for such salience in talk about desires was reported by 
Brown and Dunn (1991). They found that the saliency of desires was 
enhanced by particular pragmatic features of mothers' conversation; for 
example, desires tended to be used in a controlling context ( e.g., such as 
directing the child's behavior) and were also the subject of more causal 
references. I then extended this line of reasoning further, positing a second 
reason for why desire talk is plentiful, by hypothesizing that mothers may 
attempt to make desires more salient because they detect that children 
understand goals on some level. Goal understanding is hypothesized to be 
one of the first steps towards understanding mental states (see section 
2.2.1) and thus could be an important indicator of the child's 'mental state' 
zone of proximal development. Therefore, mother talk about desires 
initially might be very goal- and action-oriented, (e.g., "you want to look at 
the doggie?"), as well as relating directly to the child, (e.g., "you like ice 
cream, don't you?"). Alternatively, one can speculate that as children grow 
older mothers may reason that they are increasingly able to understand 
knowledge and beliefs, and others as mental agents, and so talk more about 
thoughts and knowledge. In this vein, mothers may be sensitive to changes 
in the child's conversational ability. In turn, mothers' conversation with the 
child might result in a successful exchange of information and ideas, and the 
conversation might help children to conceptualise their conversational 
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partner's belief and knowledge states by highlighting differences in 
perspectives (Harris, 1996). 
The way in which these mental states fit with the world is also of 
interest. Searle (1983) identified two different directions of fit for mental 
states. For desires, children must fit or change the world to their mental 
state ( desiring), whereas for thoughts, children must change their mental 
states to fit the world. Gopnik and Slaughter (1991) have suggested that 
this difference in fit is one reason why understanding desire is easier than 
understanding belief. Therefore, incorporating these ideas, mothers may 
introduce children more to desires when they are younger because children 
do not need to change their mental state to understanding the relation of 
this mental state to the world. Furthermore, mothers might talk more 
about thoughts and knowledge when children are older, recognising that 
changing mental states to fit the world is more difficult. Drawing these 
two ideas together and in line with the principle of scaffolding, one could 
say that mothers structure the input/ environment in ways that help 
children learn about mental states and that this lessens infants' reliance on 
innate knowledge of mental states. 
Regarding children's mental state talk, I found that between 15 and 
33 months, the percentage of children who were reported to use at least one 
type of mental state word steadily increased. In the case of think/know 
talk, however, there was a very dramatic increase in the percentage of 
children who were reported to use these terms at 33 months in relation to 
their use at 24 months. These findings are consistent with most studies 
which have documented that children first talk about desires between 18 
and 24 months and that typically they talk first about desires before they 
talk about thoughts and knowledge (see above). Furthermore, they 
initially refer to their own desires, thoughts and knowledge before they 
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Thus, mother talk mirrored a similar lag in children's use of desire 
and emotion talk before think/know talk. However, mothers talked about 
mental states even when children were not reported to be using these 
terms. I will discuss the implications of this lag in mother talk relative to 
child talk. 
7.4 Goal 2: The predictive relation between 
mother talk about mental states and children's later 
understanding of mental states 
There were two main findings with respect to this second goal. The 
first finding was that within the context of describing pictures, mothers' 
use of desire terms at 15 months was predictive nine months later not only 
of child mental state language, but also performance on the emotion-
situation task. This predictive relation was unique, having accounted for 
the child's language ability at 15 months, the mothers' socio-economic 
status, and the mothers' performance on two emotion recognition tasks. 
Significantly, no other mother mental or non-mental state language 
demonstrated a similar predictive relation. 
The second finding was that at 24 months a different predictive 
relation emerged. I found that as a whole, all types of mental state talk (i.e., 
mother talk about emotions, desires and thoughts/knowledge) were 
predictors of the first index of social understanding, a child's later mental 
state language at 33 months as reported on the MCDI. What also emerged 
however was that mother think/know talk was a more consistent predictor 
(3 of 4 correlations) than emotion talk (2 of 4 correlations) or desire talk (2 
of 4 correlations). These correlations held even after accounting for 
variance due to earlier child language, mother SES, mother's own emotion 
understanding, and other types of mother language such as non-mental 
state language. Regarding the second index of social understanding, - the 
emotion tasks - I found that only mother think/know talk at 24 months 
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any shared variance due to earlier child language, SES, and mother 
emotion understanding. In contrast, mother non-mental state talk was 
generally unrelated to later child mental state language or emotion task 
performance. 
The lack of a correlation between mother talk about desire at 15 
months and children's mental state talk 18 months later at 33 months, 
reflects how desire is more important with younger children. This concurs 
with the finding that desire talk at 24 months was a less consistent correlate 
of social understanding at 33 months than mother think/know talk. 
In the next three sections I consider the findings within the context 
of the zone of proximal development and consider in more detail the 
significance of these findings in the light of other theoretical explanations 
for a child's understanding of mind. 
7.4.1 Directionality of effect 
First and importantly, the child's language ability including their 
talk about mental states did not correlate with later mother talk about 
mental states. In other words, the extent to which children talked about 
mental states had no long-term influence on mothers' mental state talk. 
Therefore, the findings suggest a unidirectional effect such that it is what 
mothers say which drives children's understanding of emotion and their 
later use of mental state language. In the next section I examine mothers' 
early desire language. 
7.4.2 Why is desire language important? 
One question concerns why mother references to desire at 15 months 
relate to the development of later child desire and emotion understanding? 
Part of the explanation can be accounted for by general word learning, such 
that children will learn words that they most consistently hear in their 
environment (Huttenlocher et al., 1991 ). That is, children likely learn about 
mental state terms in the same way that they learn about ordinary 
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conceptual advances in their ability to understand these words as referring 
to mental states. 
The finding that mother talk about desires related uniquely to later 
child talk about desires and emotions (but not later talk about animals), 
and that mother talk about animals related uniquely to later child talk 
about animals (but not mental state talk), is consistent with this 
explanation. The findings thus extend the work by Beeghly et al. (1986) in 
that not only did I remove the effects of early child general vocabulary 
development on later desire and emotion understanding, but also I 
identified which mental state terms predict later desire and emotion 
understanding. 
The findings also suggest however, that mother talk about mental 
states does more than simply facilitate children's mental state language. It 
facilitates children's social understanding generally, specifically, their 
performance on the emotion-situation task. Although I cannot be sure that 
child mental state talk refers to mental states, my finding that mother mental 
state talk correlated with child mental state talk and emotion task 
performance is consistent with this idea. Likewise, Bartsch and Wellman's 
(1995) finding that children's early genuine desire talk correctly describes 
both their own and others' desires is consistent with the idea that this talk 
indexes a genuine understanding of the social world. 
Dunn et al. (1991) suggest that the effect of emotion and feeling state 
language is to "encourage reflection and understanding of such states" 
(p.454). Along the same lines Wellman et al. (1995) suggest that the 
development of a subjective-experiential understanding of emotion 
facilitates early understanding of the mind. Indeed, not only do children as 
young as 2 years succeed on tasks which require an understanding of the 
emotional consequences of desires (Wellman et al., 2000; Wellman & 
Woolley, 1990), but also Wellman et al. showed that 2-year-olds will 
comment on the links between desires and emotions in their everyday talk. 
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findings, is that discussion of one type of mental state such as desire, is 
likely to facilitate understanding of mental life generally. 
Thus, in very young children who are not yet able to engage in 
conversations about mental states, mother input about desire may be a 
mechanism by which children's emerging implicit understanding about 
mental life is made explicit. This mechanism can be conceptualized within 
the zone of proximal development such that mothers' use of specific types 
of mental state language at critical points in the child's development 
bootstraps the child's social understanding. Thus the timing of mental 
state input and the fit with the child's developmental level becomes critical. 
The prediction which follows from the Vygotskian framework is that as a 
child's desire understanding develops, mother references to thinking and 
knowing become important for continued evolution of mental state 
understanding. I discuss these ideas further in section 7.4.4. 
7.4.3 The role of 'links' 
Between 15 and 24 months there was no relation between non-
mental state language and later social understanding. At 24 months 
however, 'links' emerged as weakly related to one aspect of later social 
understanding: desire language. A reason why 'links' may emerge at this 
time as a predictor of later desire language is that they tend to refer to past 
events, that is, they take the child outside the current frame of reference to 
a past or separate event (see Fivush & Haden, 2002; Harley & Reese, 1999 
for an indepth discussion of these ideas). The ability to conceive of these 
two events, present and past, coincides with the time children are said to 
acquire multiple models (Perner, 1991). As discussed earlier in 2.3.1 being 
able to conceive of two realities is an important representational 
advancement. That is, the ability to hold two models is important for 
advancing desire understanding e.g., understanding others as having 
different desires or in understanding that people who share the same 
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introduce more links at this time may be facilitating the development of 
these two models of reality (past and present) or picking up on the 
development of these skills in children. The finding that children's talk 
about desires did not relate_ to mothers' later propensity to introduce links 
in her talk suggests again that this is a unidirectional effect. Unlike the 
findings in which mother desire and think/know talk correlated with 
several types of mental state language and emotion understanding, the 
relation between links was only related to a single aspect of mental state 
language and therefore it is necessary to interpret these results with some 
caution. 
7.4.4 Why does talk about thoughts and knowledge 
become increasingly important? 
As reported above, between the ages of 15 and 33 months, mothers 
exhibited a lag in their use of mental state language (first desires, then 
think/knowing), similar to the lag in children's use of these terms. This lag 
fits nicely into a zone of proximal development framework. Desires are 
introduced first because of their salience in actions and expressions, 
whereas references to thinking and knowing are introduced when children 
begin to refer more frequently to their own desires and have a more 
sophisticated understanding of desire. Indeed at 18 months of age children 
are beginning to understand that others can have different desires 
(Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). The finding that at 24 months, mother talk 
about thoughts and knowledge emerged as the strongest predictor of later 
child mental state language and emotion understanding is consistent with 
these ideas. 
One reason why the incremental exposure to mother mental state 
terms such as thinking and knowing might have a later impact on child 
mental state language and emotion understanding, may be that such 
exposure introduces children to a less goal-oriented and more information-
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initially conceive of others as agents who want to achieve certain goals. 
Later, around age 2, they begin to engage in conversation solely for the 
purpose of exchanging information and become aware of people as 
differing in knowledge and beliefs. Through the very process of 
information exchange, conversation affords immediate insight into how 
others' attitudes towards a state of affairs sometimes differ from one's own. 
Harris (1996) proposed that a child's growing competence as a 
conversationalist helped them to understand thoughts and knowledge. As 
Harris emphasizes, the transition from desire talk to think/know talk 
occurs in conversation where there is no 'immediate plan of action'. Thus, 
moving away from talk about desires to thoughts/knowledge, forces the 
child to engage in a different type of talk, which not only extends their 
skills as conversationalists, but also introduces them to attitudes towards 
concepts which are not necessarily the same as their own and which are not 
linked to objects and goals. It is also plausible however, that despite 
Harris' proposal, the context in which mothers talk about desires may 
reflect an alternate perspective on a current reality. Future research would 
be informative in establishing whether the introduction of different 
perspectives through mental state talk assists children's understanding of 
others' mental states and emotion understanding. 
7.5 Goal 3: The importance of talk about the child 
versus talk about others 
This study was the first to consider the predictive effect of mothers' 
talk about the child's mental states versus her talk about others' mental 
states and children's later social understanding. There were two main 
findings. First, I found that across all mothers' mental state language, 
reference to the child's mental states at 15 months was a predictor of the 
child's later mental state language and emotion understanding at 24 
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was a predictor of child mental state language as well as child performance 
on the emotion tasks, nine months later. 
The second finding concerned individual mental state terms. 
Mothers' early talk about the child's desires was the most consistent 
correlate of children's later desire and emotion language between 15 and 24 
months whereas talk about others' thoughts and knowledge was the principle 
correlate between 24 and 33 months. 
I first discuss why the general tendency for mother talk about the 
child's mental states may be more important initially for predicting later 
child mental state language and emotion understanding. Once again, these 
findings can be situated within the 'zone of proximal development', such 
that talk about the child may initially be best for scaffolding a conceptual 
understanding of mental states and emotions. 
One idea is that mothers who refer to their child's mental states 
could be construed as more mind-minded (Meins et al., 2002). To recall, 
Meins et al. (2003) found that early maternal mind-minded comments (at 6 
months) facilitated later false belief understanding (at 4 years). That is, 
mothers represent their child's mental states through appropriate mind-
minded comments, specifically, comments that accurately reflect how the 
child feels and acts. Meins et al. (2003) theorized that mothers who tended 
to refer to their children's minds appropriately at 6 months would continue 
to do so when children begin to acquire language. Thus, the finding in my 
study that child mental state comments were also important predictors at 
15 months (a time at which children are starting to talk), provides tentative 
evidence for Meins' proposal. What appears to be critical during the early 
time points (15 - 24 months) is that child-centered comments about the 
mind and not other child-centered comments such as "links" were 
predictors of later child mental state language and emotion task 
performance. 
Subsequently, as Meins (2002) further proposes, the stage at which 
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'linguistic and conceptual scaffolding' may occur. Thus, my finding that 
comments about others' mental states were important predictors between 
24 and 33 months is again consistent with Meins' findings that early but not 
later (48 months) mind-minded comments facilitated subsequent false-
belief understanding. 
Some caution is in order, however, when making these analogous 
explanations. There are two differences between Meins' study and the 
present one. First, I did not explicitly code for the appropriateness of 
mothers' comments. Nevertheless, the context of the picture task 
constrained mothers' comments such that it would be difficult to 
misinterpret a child's mental states (e.g., to look at a particular picture). 
The second difference between Meins' studies (1999-2003) and the present 
study was that I examined how mother talk related to different indices of 
children's social understanding (mental state language and emotion 
understanding versus false belief). 
These cautions aside, the present findings also extend current 
research such as that of Brown and Dunn (1991) and Beeghly, Bretherton 
and Mervis (1986), by demonstrating that not only do mothers increase 
their references to others' mental states between 24 and 36 months, but also 
that reference to others' mental states become a predictive factor in the 
child's later understanding of emotion and mental state language, over and 
above the child's language levels, SES and mother emotion understanding. 
When children start engaging in conversation, they now have a tool· to 
express their own mental states and to learn about others' mental states. It 
seems plausible, therefore, that given this representational tool, mothers 
who begin to refer more to mental states other than the child's may assist in 
developing a child's capacity to represent mental states. I next consider 
other concurrent cognitive changes that may also help explain why talk 
about others becomes increasingly important. 
In order to understand the referent of the mental state, children need 
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being referred to. The comprehension and production of pronouns 
requires children to have some grasp of the deictic nature of these words, 
that is, that the referent of the word differs depending on who is uttering 
the word and that within a communicative context, the same pronoun may 
apply to several different people (e.g., 'you'). Children typically acquire 
the 1st person pronoun (e.g., 'C 'me') before the 2nd person pronoun (e.g., 
'you', Chiat, 1986). In considering the cognitive pre-requisites for 
understanding pronouns, one study has identified a relation between the 
understanding of Level I visual perspective tasks Gudging what others can 
or can't see) and the acquisition of personal pronouns (Ricard, Girouard, & 
Decarie, 1999). Ricard et al. found that children's success on two Level I 
perspective taking tasks tended to precede their full mastery 
(comprehension and production) of 1st and 2nd person pronouns. In other 
studies, personal pronoun competence (i.e., greater use of pronouns as 
rated by mothers on questionnaires) has also been related to the 
development of visual self-recognition (Lewis & Ramsay, 2004). Against 
this background, children's developing understanding of visual 
perspective and their corresponding conceptualization of self ( as indexed 
by pronoun use) coincides with developing conversational abilities. In 
other words, understanding the subjective nature of thoughts and 
knowledge may correspond with an understanding of mental or 
psychological points of view or perspective (Harris, 1996, 2005). Such an 
understanding may be facilitated by conversational ability, which provides 
a context in which these points of view may be presented. 
The ability to understand different perspectives also corresponds to 
Perner's (1991) multiple models stage in which children develop the 
capacity to conceive of at least two models of reality. Thus children at the 
second time point (24 months) likely benefited from mother talk about 
others because their understanding was supported by a whole host of 
simultaneously developing cognitive abilities, which assist in developing 
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self and other. Moreover, the finding in this thesis that mothers' later 
referring style (self, child, other) was related to children's earlier pronoun 
competence suggests a potential avenue by which mothers may detect that 
children understand others' perspectives. These findings are interesting 
when considered within the overarching uni-directional finding that it was 
mothers' input that facilitated later child mental state language and emotion 
understanding rather than the other way around. It may be that mothers 
monitor children's developing concept of self versus other through 
pronoun use and that this determines the extent to which they will begin to 
refer more to others' mental states. 
Also in need of explanation is the way in which mothers' referring 
styles (self, child, other) interacted with individual mental state types 
(desire, think/know). To recall, mothers' early talk (15 months) about the 
child's desires (rather than others' desires) was the more consistent correlate 
of children's later desire and emotion language between 15 and 24 months 
whereas talk about others' thoughts and knowledge rather than the child's 
thoughts and knowledge (at 24 months) was the principle correlate between 
24 and 33 months. 
I first discuss the significance of talk about the child's versus others' 
desires. One way in which mothers can highlight or make salient desire 
understanding is to situate it within the child's frame of reference. In line 
with the zone of proximal development, maternal references to the child's 
(rather than others') desires could represent a scaffolding mechanism by 
which the child's implicit understanding of desire (at 15 months) is made 
explicit. This seems to be particularly pertinent to understanding desire. 
Mental state terms might help infants to understand their own internal 
experiences as "wanting" or "not liking", whereas a label applied initially 
only to others might describe their external expression of desire but not 
their internal experience ( unless inf ants had had the experience of 
connecting their own internal experiences with particular mental state 
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mental states by first situating them within the child's experiential frame of 
reference (talk about the child), before extending the frame of reference to 
include others. Indeed mothers referred initially more frequently to the 
child's desires before referring more to others' desires. Between 24 - 33 
months, mothers referred more frequently to children's thoughts and 
knowledge. Booth, Hall, Robison and Kim's (1997) findings suggest that 
parents begin to talk more about others' rather than the child's cognitive 
mental states (specifically, 'know') at about 45 months. Given, however, 
that my study stops at 33 months, I cannot address the issue of whether 
mothers increase their talk about others' thoughts and knowledge. 
Such a model has also been proposed for the development of action 
verbs, whereby an understanding of persons as intentional agents of action 
cannot emerge until the child understands the similarities between self and 
other. In order to do this, a child must first conceptualize the action as it 
relates to the self, before it can be extended to others (Huttenlocher et al., 
1983). Such a bias exists in parent input, in that action categories that refer 
to the child are more frequent than those that refer to others (Huttenlocher, 
Smiley, & Ratner, 1983). 
In addition, the finding that mother references to others' desires 
were also related to children's later mental state understanding, (though 
less consistently so than referring to the child's desires) suggests again, that 
the timing with which mothers introduce the referent of mental state words 
may depend on the extent to which children have "internalized" these 
mental state terms as they relate to themselves. Along similar lines, and in 
keeping with Booth et al. (1997), I predicted that as children "internalize" 
the notion of thoughts and knowledge as they relate to themselves, 
mothers would increase references to others. 
Contrary to my prediction, however, at 24 months, mother talk 
about others' thinking and knowing (rather than the child's thoughts and 
knowledge) was a more consistent predictor of later child mental state 
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finding is that the distance between the assessment at time point 2 and time 
point 3 was too large. It may be that at an earlier age ( e.g., 28-30 months) 
reference to the child's thoughts/knowledge would be more frequent and 
would be a more consistent predictor of later child social understanding . 
Yet, there are other reasons why mothers' talk about thoughts and 
knowledge might operate in a different way to desires explaining why the 
self-other pattern did not emerge for thoughts and knowledge as predicted. 
One reason is that thoughts and knowledge cannot be made salient in the 
way desires can be. Indeed Brown and Dunn (1991) suggest that this lack 
of salience is what prevents children's use of such terms. In addition, I 
propose that mother talk about thoughts and knowledge might be most 
effective for the child when they understand mental states as referring to 
others. Therefore, initially, talking about the child's desires is more 
important because children have yet to master the self-other distinction at 
15 months. By the time they are 24 months of age, they have a better 
understanding of the self-other distinction in desire, as evidenced in their 
success on the Repacholi and Gopnik (1997) broccoli task, their relative 
mastery of personal pronouns and their purported ability to represent 
multiple models (Perner, 1991). Therefore, at 24 months, talk about the 
child's mental states (e.g., their thoughts and knowledge) is no longer so 
important. Indeed, talk about others' thoughts and knowledge is more 
important because children might now be relatively good at understanding 
their own mental states. 
Theoretically, these findings might attest to the initial importance of 
the zone of proximal development as a mechanism for bootstrapping 
children's early understanding of others' minds via simulation. In 
particular, by initially focusing on the child's mental states, mothers are 
consolidating a child's understanding of mental states as they relate to 
themselves, before they use these insights to understand others' mental 
states. This focus is most important when children are young ( e.g., 15 
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distinction. This scaffolding pattern mirrors the process necessary for 
simulation in that Harris's (1991) version of simulation theory argues that a 
successful simulation requires children to imagine how they would feel in 
another person's circumstances, making self-knowledge paramount. 
7.6 Summary 
The zone of proximal development provides a conceptual 
framework for understanding the relation between the incremental 
exposure of mother mental state talk and children's later mental state 
language and emotion understanding. I propose that more knowledgeable 
conversational partners such as parents manage children's exposure to 
mental state language, both in the type of mental state language and the 
referent, and that this managed exposure facilitates a child's developing 
social understanding. 
First, mothers talk about desires because children have an early-
developing appreciation of goals. By focusing initially on desire language 
mothers bootstrap a child's social understanding in general by making 
explicit a child's implicit understanding of desire. This initial boost to 
children's general mental state understanding provides subsequent 
opportunities for mothers to talk beyond desires and to focus on thoughts 
and knowledge. Consequently, mothers who talked more about thoughts 
and knowledge rather than desires at the second time point assisted later 
mental state understanding. 
Another dimension to the zone of proximal development and 
integral to the success of this incremental exposure, is the relative tendency 
for mothers to talk about the child's versus others' mental states. Initially, 
mothers focus on the child's mental states by providing a label for the 
child's own experiences of desire. As children internalize their 
understanding of desire as it relates to themselves, they are able to further 
appreciate others' desires. These ideas are in line with notions that 
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on the process of simulation. Simulation accounts typically stipulate the 
importance of initially forming self-representations before this self-
understanding can be used to understand the actions or behaviour of 
others. This developmental stage also coincides with the idea that children 
develop multiple models of reality evidenced through their increase in 
pronoun use, pretend play and understanding of others' versus their own 
desires. Once children achieve this developmental level, mothers focus 
more on others' mental states, especially thoughts and knowledge. 
Although my study was not designed to adjudicate between the 
various theoretical explanations for the lag between desire and belief 
understanding in children, the zone of proximal development does provide 
a way of linking mother input with theoretical explanations for children's 
developing social understanding. 
In conclusion, this is the first study to examine in such young 
children, the effects of mental state language (and the referent of such 
language), beginning before children use any desire, emotion or other 
mental state language themselves. The initial finding was that mother talk 
about desires was predictive of later mental state talk and emotion 
understanding. This study is also the first to consider the predictive 
relation between referring to the child's versus others' mental states and 
later mental state language and emotion understanding. My finding that 
references to the child's desires initially, and others' thoughts and 
knowledge subsequently, were unique predictors of later desire and 
emotion understanding highlights the importance of identifying the 
referent in future research of this type. Further, this is the first study to 
examine the effect of mothers' desire, emotion and belief language on 
children, having accounted for mothers' own mental state understanding 
( emotion recognition). As such, it provides the clearest evidence possible 
short of intervention studies that the things mothers say facilitate children's 
knowledge about mental states. This result is consistent with recent 
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understanding is determined by environmental rather than genetic factors 
(Hughes et al., 2005; Ronald, Happe, Hughes, & Plomin, 2005) 
7.7 Future research directions 
A limitation of this study is that I only examined a partial index of 
child social understanding ( desire and emotion understanding). Future 
research might examine how mother talk relates to other aspects of 
children's social understanding. 
Given the purported importance of children's conversational ability 
and the relation to developing points of view (Harris, 2005), an interesting 
adaptation of the study would be to assess children's abilities on Level I 
perspective-taking tasks between 18 months and 24 months of age when 
children are beginning to use 1st person pronouns. One prediction would 
be that mothers begin to introduce more mental state language that refers 
to others' mental states when children are aware of others being able to 
take a different visual perspective on concrete objects. This would provide 
further evidence for the interrelated role of perspective taking, the 
understanding of mental states as referring to others and conversational 
development. In addition, it would provide support for the finding that 
children's pronoun use may influence the referring style of mothers (see 
above). 
A feature of this study was that mothers' tendency to use mental 
state language was not influenced by the children's mental state language 
at an earlier time point. There remains the possibility that child influence 
on parents takes place on a micro-level time scale (maternal adjustments in 
each context) but there is no long-term effect of child language on mother 
language. Furthermore, research could be directed at examining the cues 
parents use to modify their scaffolding of mental state language. This 
could be examined in two separate contexts. First, it would be interesting 
to examine the paralinguistic features of the younger age group's 
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parents' speech, especially their responses to parents' mental state talk. 
Parents may respond to specific contingencies between children's non-
verbal behaviour (indicating understanding or lack of understanding) and 
their references to mental states. These initial cues may provide the 
starting point for the zone of proximal development ( e.g., children who 
show responsiveness to mothers' initial references to desire terms within 
the context of goal understanding, may encourage mothers to continue 
introducing and using mental state talk). From this initial analysis it may 
be possible to develop a training study that directly assesses the influence 
of children's non-verbal responding and mother use of mental state 
language. As has been well documented, at this age, children are 
developing and consolidating their joint attention skills. Mothers' 
responsiveness to children's joint attention skills may form the parameters 
of the zone of proximal development. One hypothesis would be that 
mothers structure the zone of proximal development on the basis of their 
infant or child's non-verbal responding (e.g., their joint attention skills). 
To further explore the incremental nature of mother mental state 
speech and its relation to social understanding, one could examine how 
mothers describe deceptive objects to children ( e.g., perspective shifting + 
sentential complements, versus perspective shifting only, versus sentential 
complements only). To recall, a variety of studies (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; 
Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003) have shown 
that the use of sentential complements is correlated or assists (through 
training) children's false-belief performance. In addition, discourse that 
presents different perspectives on a situation is also facilitative of later 
false-belief understanding (Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). Given, that I 
have found that mothers scaffold children's exposure to mental state 
language, an interesting question would be how mothers deal with a 
situation, which could potentially teach children about mental states that is, 
talking about a deceptive object. Mothers may operate at three potential 
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to the deceptive nature of the object using simple perspective shifting 
discourse (e.g., What, a rock? Never, it's a sponge, I see that), or they may 
do so using mental state language in sentential complements as well ( e.g., 
she thinks that it's a sponge). These styles could be ranked according to 
representational difficulty and a further question would be to consider if 
there was any relation between the children's level of language, their 
mothers' style of talk and children's later performance on false-belief task. 
A second but related strand of research could examine in more 
detail the range of speech acts that children use over the 15 - 33 month time 
period. As was demonstrated in this study, children's language ability as 
reported by parents was not predictive of mental state use, suggesting a 
unidirectional effect of maternal talk on later child social understanding. 
An interesting measure would be to extend the analysis of children's 
language by examining their pragmatic competence as indexed by their 
range of speech acts (Dore, 1986). It may be that mothers are sensitive to 
children's speech act use and use these as an indicator of their zone of 
proximal development. A study by Ziatas, Durkin and Pratt (2003) 
demonstrated differences in the speech acts of autistic children compared 
to specific language impairment and normal children. Children on the 
autistic spectrum referred less to internal states and causal explanations for 
behaviour. Also, autistic and Aspergers individuals referred more to 
desires than thoughts_ and knowledge compared to matched SLI and 
normal children. Employing a longitudinal design. (similar to this present 
study) would be informative in revealing whether mothers' mental state 
language was sensitive to the range of speech acts in normal, autistic and 
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIONS AND ORDER OF PRESENTATION OF PHOTOGRAPHS IN 
BOOK 1 OF PICTURE-BOOK TASK. 
1. Girl and mother feeding ducks at the park 
2. Girl holding a kitten 
3. Girl pushing a kitten in a toy shopping basket 
4. Boy crying (no context) 
5. Boy poking out his tongue in disgust (no context) 
6. Woman milking a cow 
7. Boy throwing a stick to a dog 
8. Man feeding seagulls off the side of a boat 
9. A girl in a swimming pool with an angry expression on her face 
10. A girl being given an injection at the doctors 
11. A baby crying while being fed food 
12. A girl lying in bed ill while playing a puzzle 
13. A boy clapping his hands after building a tower of blocks 
14. A very young baby screaming 
15. A girl and a dog asleep together 
16. A boy hugging a lamb 
17. A boy screwing his face up in disgust while being handed a spoon of 
medicine 
DESCRIPTIONS AND ORDER OF PRESENTATION OF PHOTOGRAPHS IN BOOK 2 OF 
PICTURE-BOOK TASK. 
1. An angry boy (no context) 
;! 

















2. A woman and child laughing at each other 
3. A group of three children playing sword fighting 
4. A surprised looking boy 
5. A girl looking at a frog while imitating its expression 
6. A frightened boy 
7. Two baby boys crying while surrounded by toys 
8. An adult holding a baby who is crying 
9. A grandmother and baby laughing 
10. A small boy holding a frog 
11. A fireman carrying a boy 
( 
12. A father smiling while holding a crying boy 
13.A girl holding her nose in front of some onions . 




Want, hope, wish, care (about), afraid (that), like, love, dream, prefer, keen 
on, think, know, believe, expect, wonder 
Emotion 
Annoyed, hurtful, bored, unhappy, feel bad, sad, upset, fed up, miserable, 
cross, grumpy, angry, mad, scared, frightened, afraid, worried, shocked, 
shy, surprised, pleased, happy, enjoy, excited, fun, interested, frustrated, 
missed, disgusted, o.k. [feel o.k.], good [feel good], better 
Physical state 
Cry, smile, laugh, giggle, hurt, in pain, ill 
The senses 
Look, listen, cold [body feeling cold], hot [body feeling hot] 













Hard [difficult], remember, guess, dream, forget, mean [I mean that], real 
Modulations of assertion 
Might, bet, curious, expect, sure, definitely, possibly, maybe wonder, 
suppose, certain, certainly, could be, perhaps, reckon, figure, guess, must, 
probably 
APPENDIX D: EMOTION SITUATION TASK VIGNETTES (CORRECT ANSWER IN 
PARENTHESES AND ASTERISK DENOTES TRIAL WAS GIVEN AT llME 3) 
Situation illustrated (Correct Answer) 
1. *Santa giving a child a present (Happiness) 
2. *A girl cuddling a puppy (Happiness) 
3. *Lion chasing boy (Fear) 
4. *A boy and his teddy bear with a broken leg {Sadness) 
5. Child with leg wound (Sadness) 






6. Child watching a baby's diaper being changed (Disgust) disgust, fear 
7. Child breaking plate in front of mother (Anger) anger, disgust 
8. A boy playing peek-a-boo with a girl round the corner (Surprise) surprise, anger 
APPENDIX E: BODY EMOTION TASK VIGNETTES (CORRECT ANSWER IN 
PARENTHESES AND ASTERISK DENOTES TRIAL WAS GIVEN AT TIME 33 
Situation illustrated (Correct Answer) 
1. *Girl sitting on wall with head in hands (sad) 
2. Girl sitting on chair hugging her legs (sad) 
3. *Man holding woman's handing and jumping at beach (happiness) 
4. *Man with head in his hands (sad) 
5. *Woman with hands in the air splashing the sea with man (happiness) 
6. Boy with grandfather at beach pretending to be aeroplanes (happiness) 
7. Little girl jumping (happiness) 
8. Football player kneeling on the ground with head in hands (sadness) 
3 For this task, children were only given a forced choice of happiness and sadness. * 
denotes items used at Time 3. 
